SPECIAL ADVISERS: BOON OR BANE?
Here you can browse the report together with the Proceedings of the Committee. The published report was ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 28 February 2001.
Different rules for different tribes?
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ANNEXES TO THE REPORT
Analysis of Departmental replies
Letter from Sir Richard Wilson of 1 August 2000
Special advisers in no 10 and the cabinet office and their responsibilities
The Select Committee on Public Administration has agreed to the following Report:—
Context
1. In 1999 the Committee decided to carry out a wide-ranging
inquiry into 'Making Government Work', looking at issues relating
to the Government's Modernising Government and civil service reform
programmes of the Government. We intend to report on these shortly.
As we took evidence, we decided to separate out certain strands
of the inquiry for particular attention. Special advisers was
one of those we chose. Their role has become contentious, but
we agree with one of our witnesses, Professor Anthony King, that
advisers are too important to be the subject of party political
controversy. [11]
We hope we can contribute to sensible discussion of their role.
2. The question of what advice and support Ministers
need and want, beyond that supplied by the permanent civil service,
is central to the issue of special advisers that exercises so
much parliamentary, public and media commentary. It is an issue
that usually generates more political heat than useful light.
3. The use of special advisers is not new. The existence,
since the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of the 1850s of a civil
service which was politically neutral and recruited and promoted
on merit, and the absence of a cabinet system of ministerial
advisers (such as prevails in many other European countries) or
the wholesale change of administration (as happens in the United
States of America) has led Ministers and Prime Ministers, certainly
as far back as Lloyd George, to appoint confidants. These were
people who shared and understood ministerial preoccupations and
had political skills and contacts that civil servants lacked.
Such people may either bring up-to-date specialist knowledge beyond
that available in-house or help the Minister to stay in touch
with the world beyond Whitehall (or both). The current system
was formalised in 1974, when Prime Minister Harold Wilson decided
to allow Ministers to appoint advisers on a regular basis. While
many advisers are attached to individual Ministers, there have
periodically been groups of them employed at 10 Downing Street
to advise the Prime Minister of the day on wider policy issues.
4. Special advisers are part of a long-established
tradition for widening the advice available to Ministers. In 1968,
the Fulton Report on the civil service said of the tradition:
'We welcome the practice as a means of bringing new men and ideas
into the service of the state'.[12]
Since then, the explosion of think-tanks of assorted kinds has
opened up new links between politicians and external sources of
policy advice. Some want to take this process further, perhaps
through a fully-fledged cabinet system or putting policy
advice to government out to contract, but here we confine ourselves
to the more limited terrain of special advisers.
5. According to the Ministerial Code, every Cabinet
Minister may appoint up to two advisers, "political"
or "expert". In practice, as the Neill Committee has
pointed out in its Sixth Report (Reinforcing Standards),
this restriction is not universally observed, particularly in
the Departments with wider remits, and in response the Government
have agreed to amend the Code accordingly. Ministers may also
appoint an unspecified number of unpaid advisers, while the growth
in the number of Parliamentary Private Secretaries (PPSs) in recent
times (there are currently 53), has extended this support system
to even the most junior Ministers (at the cost, some argue, of
diminished parliamentary independence in relation to the Executive).
6. At 22nd January 2001 there were 78 special advisers
in post, the pay costs for whom were estimated to be £4.4
million in the current financial year.[13]
As of December 2000, forty advisers worked in Departments,[14]
the remainder in Downing Street, where no limit applies. On 11
February 2000 of the advisers in Downing Street, 12 worked in
the Policy Unit, 3 in the Research and Information Unit, 5 (including
two from the Media Monitoring Unit) in the Press Office and 2
in the Strategic Communications Unit[15],
figures confirmed by the Cabinet Office on 27 February 2001 as
being still being broadly correct. Two advisers (the Prime Minister's
Chief Press Secretary and his Chief of Staff) have authority over
civil servants under the Civil Service Order in Council as revised
in 1997; the Order contains provision that up to three may be
in this position.
Conduct of
the inquiry
7. We heard oral evidence specifically on special
advisers from Lord Lipsey, Lord Blackwell and Dr William Plowden
(former special advisers) and Professor Anthony King (Professor
of Government, University of Essex) Lord Blackwell. Other relevant
oral evidence, taken mainly in the context of our parallel inquiries
into Making Government Work and the Ministerial Code, was heard
(in chronological order) from: Sir Richard Wilson (Cabinet Secretary);
Professor Robert Hazell (Director, Constitution Unit and Professor
of Government and the Constitution, University College, London);
Professor Peter Hennessy (Professor of Contemporary History, Queen
Mary and Westfield College, University of London); Sir Peter Kemp
(former Permanent Secretary and Foundation for Accountancy and
Management); Professor Vernon Bogdanor (Professor of Government,
Oxford University) ; Kate Jenkins (Kate Jenkins Associates); Lord
Neill of Bladen (Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public
Life); Rt Hon John Major MP (former Prime Minister); the FDA (the
trades union representing senior civil servants); Mr WR McKay,
Clerk of the House of Commons and Mr Archie Cameron, Director
of Operations, Fees Office; representatives of the firms of accountants
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Hard Dowdy and Silver Altman; and from
Ms Margaret McDonagh and Professor Keith Ewing for the Labour
Party, Mr David Prior MP and Mr Stuart Harris for the Conservative
Party and Mr Nigel Bliss and Mr Ben Williams for the Liberal Democrats;
and from the Rt Hon Dr David Clarke MP, the Rt Hon Michael Heseltine
MP and Lord Simon of Highbury. We received a paper from Leighton
Jenkins (King's College, London)[16].
We are grateful to all those who have assisted us.
8. We note that Ministers in the Scottish Executive
and Assembly Secretaries in the National Assembly for Wales have
the right, under an Order in Council, to appoint, on a collective
basis, a limited number of special advisers. It is not for us
to consider these except for comparative purposes.
Issues
9. The whole question of the role of special advisers
in government has been the subject of much attention and some
controversy. A range of issues and concerns has been raised about
them. Are they necessary? Who should pay for them? How many should
there be? How are they appointed? What do they do? Are there different
kinds? What is their relationship to permanent civil servants?
How accountable are they? Such questions have helped to shape
our inquiry. We do not claim to have given them all exhaustive
treatment, but we have tried to examine those that seemed to us
to have a particular significance for the conduct of government.
10. Special advisers have been among the subjects
considered by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, in its
first Report of 1995 and then in the Sixth Report, published in
January 2000. The First Report recommended that they should be
subject to the business appointment rules under which former civil
servants are restricted in the employment they may take up after
leaving the service. The Government accepted this recommendation.
In its Sixth Report, Reinforcing Standards,[17]
the Committee rejected the suggestion that advisers should be
paid out of party funds and made a number of recommendations directed
to limiting their numbers, regulating their conduct and extending
parliamentary oversight. These recommendations have been largely
accepted by the Government and will be incorporated in the proposed
Civil Service Act. The subject of advisers figured prominently
in the debate on the Report which took place in the House on 3rd
July 2000.
11. Our interest in the subject of advisers differs
somewhat from the Neill Committee's. Its focus was mainly in the
ethical aspects of the issue, whereas we are also concerned with
the part that special advisers play in the machinery of government.
Our canvas is therefore broader. As will be seen, our conclusions
also differ in some respects from those of the Neill Committee,
most particularly on the matter of how any limitation on numbers
is to be achieved, but we benefited greatly from the Committee's
work.
The value
of advisers
12. Lord Neill reported that 'almost all witnesses
made clear their view that special advisers were valuable components
of the machinery of government'.[18]
This conclusion reflected those of a number of studies over more
than thirty years.[19]
The Neill Committee itself commented: 'We believe that special
advisers have a valuable role to play precisely because they are
free to act and advise in a way that a politically-impartial civil
servant cannot. None of our witnesses dissented from this
general view. A former adviser, William Plowden, summarised their
value: they can 'vicariously multiply Ministers' contacts with
MPs, officials, outside interests and also with other Ministers,
including the Prime Minister; evaluate proposals and advice coming
up from officials; consult sources other than those favoured by
officials; act as an informal sounding board for a Minister's
ideas or anxieties'.[20]
Enthusiasts of this view argue that special advisers form a useful
counterweight to what is sometimes perceived as civil service
inertia, but even the FDA, the civil service trades union representing
the grades most likely to feel threatened by advisers, were sanguine
about their use. In their view the arrangement brought general
benefits all round though there were 'occasions when....you get
problems with 'individuals'.[21]
This is a useful reminder that whatever the benefits in principle
much depends on the quality and contribution of individual advisers.
The FDA also explained how the existence of advisers can help
the smooth functioning of the civil service: 'Within the UK system,
Ministers inevitably need certain tasks undertaking that, were
they performed by civil servants, would take them across a political
line. In practice the current system allows those functions to
be undertaken by special advisers, thus preserving the impartiality
of the civil service. Moreover, a special adviser performing their
job effectively and reflecting the views of their Minister can
assist greatly in the smooth running of the Department'.[22]
Nor did they think there was anything exceptional about the way
ministers in the present Government used advisers, other than
that 'Some of them had placed slightly more emphasis on the role
of special advisers in certain circumstances'.[23]
They even agreed that the number per Minister might possibly be
increased from two to three without resulting in a cabinet
system.[24]
Lord Lipsey reported the alarm of one Permanent Secretary,
on being told that his incoming Minister proposed to work without
a special adviser.[25]
However, this general agreement on the value of advisers did not
prevent concerns being expressed about some aspects of the present
arrangements. We discuss these concerns shortly.
A misdirected
attack?
13. The number of special advisers has almost doubled
under the present Government, reflecting its expressed intention
to strengthen the centre of government. The number of advisers,
starting in single figures in the early stages of Mrs Thatcher's
first administration, had doubled by the time of her resignation
in 1990. A further doubling took place during the six and a half
years of the Major administration, peaking at 38 in early 1997.
In January 2001 there were 78. This increase has been the subject
of some adverse comment: for example, Professor Hennessy referred
to special advisers as being 'near rampant'.[26]
14. It is in No 10 Downing Street that the growth
in the number of advisers has been most marked. Exact figures
for earlier years are hard to come by, but according to Dennis
Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, from 1995 to 1997 there were six.[27]
According to a diagram supplied to us by Sir Richard Wilson in
February 2000[28]
there were at that time 27 special advisers out of a total of
149 staff. They included the Chief of Staff and his deputy, the
Chief Press Secretary, 12 out of 21 staff in the Policy Unit,
five out of fourteen in the Press Office and two out of eight
in the Strategic Communications Unit. It is in part these developments
that have led some commentators, including Professor Hennessy,
to talk about the development of a Prime Minister's Department
that will not speak its name.[29]
15. We believe that much of the criticism of the
use of special advisers, concentrating as it does on their numbers,
is misdirected. If they really improve the machinery of government,
then it is clearly sensible to have as many as the system requires.
If they are ineffective, or even damaging, then it is sensible
to cull them. The key question is not how many there are, but
what contribution they make to effective government. When this
is established, the further questions concern the framework and
rules within which they operate. Although we accept the general
evidence on the value of advisers, it would be useful to have
more particular evidence. Unfortunately, because of the limitations
on the information available, it has not been possible for us
to explore this as fully as we would have liked.
16. Advisers are appointed by Ministers with the
consent of the Prime Minister. This system, with no external checks,
opens up the question of how it can be established that those
appointed represent value for money and are not simply the recipients
of patronage. As Professor King said: 'We are talking about seventyone
people, of whom roughly fifty are out there in special departments.
Whether the special advisers I pick these names at random
in the Department of Health and the Department for Education
and Employment are performing effectively I simply do not know.
I suspect nobody knows except the minister in each department.
I have no reason to think that they are ineffective but I have
no evidence with which to measure their effectiveness either'.[30]
This is an important point, to which we return.
17. There are of course bound to be problems in assessing
the effectiveness of people recruited to advise on policy. The
Clerk of the House referred to a similar difficulty in relation
to the employment of staff out of Short Money, that is financial
assistance to opposition parties (see paras 40 to 53), as it is
difficult to assess value for money received for expenditure on
the development of policies which are not implemented.[31]
The difficulties are apparent, but, as the case for special advisers
depends on a view of their effectiveness, we would like to see
this issue receive more attention. One place to start is to try
to find out who they are.
Who are they?
18. Advisers are a kind of civil servant, but an
anomalous kind. They do not have to be appointed on merit; their
performance is not assessed by other civil servants; they are
appointed personally by a Minister, with the approval of the Prime
Minister; and they do not have to observe the normal civil service
principles relating to political impartiality. Four documents
govern their employment: the Ministerial Code, which authorises
each Cabinet Minister to appoint up to two advisers (a limit not
universally applied in Departments and which does not apply at
all to No 10 Downing Street); the Civil Service Orders in Council,
which first derogated from the requirement that all civil servants
be appointed on merit and subsequently allowed up to three to
be given authority over civil servants); the Model Contract for
Special Advisers (established and published in May 1997 by the
Labour Government) which is designed to set out what they may
and may not do; and the Civil Service Code - to which, with the
exception of the requirements relating to objectivity and impartiality
- they are all subject.
19. Professor King thought that the status of advisers
as being 'neither hog, dog nor mutton'[32]
was the result of a historical accident and should now be reviewed.
He observed that 'at the top of government in this country we
have always had ministers or civil servants, and when special
advisers appeared on the scene there seemed to be felt a need
to assimilate them either to ministers or civil servants. They
clearly could not be assimilated to ministers...therefore they
were assimilated to civil servants and given civil servant-like
status'.[33]
He suggested that 'we should consider whether there should not
now be accepted as being in government three groups of people-
ministers, career officials and special advisers and whether there
ought not to be for special advisers not merely their own model
contract but rules governing their behaviour, statements governing
their responsibilities and indeed statements of what they should
not do and perhaps a separate code of ethics relating to them'.[34]
Lord Lipsey took a similar view: 'What I think is the cause of
a lot of our frustrations in this area is that we are trying to
push everything into a box called "civil service as we have
always known it" and some things do not get in that box.
Rather than shove it into the box, I would rather see a new box
in which it fits comfortably, which is open, above board and subject
to public scrutiny'.[35]
These are important points and we return to them later.
20. If judgements are to be made about the value
of special advisers, it is necessary to have at least basic information
about who they are and what they do. While the names of advisers
and the broad salary bands which cover them are published,[36]
not much other information about them is available. Parliamentary
Questions to Ministers about the activities of special advisers
tend to elicit responses along the lines of 'the travel is consonant
with the Model Contract'. Professor King observed that 'we know
a fair amount about how many there are in government at the moment
and we know a good deal about what they are paid, but I do not
think we know enough about who they are, their educational background,
their career histories'.[37]
We wrote to all Departments asking for this information, as well
as for information about the policy areas covered by each adviser
and the nature of their work. The responses we received were illuminating
in their variety, both in terms of what was said and what was
not said. The Department of Culture, Media and Sport, for instance,
provided full details including hobbies and number of examination
passes, while the Ministry of Defence replied that 'requests to
Departments about the educational qualifications and career history
of any civil servant would normally be turned down on the grounds
that it is personal information between the employer and employee.
If individuals choose to provide such information.eg entries in
Who's Who, Whitehall Companion etc, then that is a decision for
them. It is not, however, for Departments to make public information
that has been given in confidence' (see Annex 1). The Department
of Health provided the information while making it clear that
this was because the individual had agreed that they should.
21. In some respects there is more transparency about
advisers than there has been in the past (for instance, the Model
Contract governing their employment is now published, though individual
contracts are not). Yet in other respects there remains insufficient
information available about them. As an example, we were not able
to take evidence from any serving advisers. Our written request
to the Cabinet Office for clarification on the general position
on advisers giving evidence drew the response that it was open
to the Committee to invite anyone they thought fit but that Ministers
might nonetheless decide that the individual invited would not
be the most appropriate person to appear.[38]
This indication of advisers being off-limits was confirmed when
our specific invitation to Jonathan Powell, the Prime Minister's
Chief of Staff was turned down[39]
and we were offered the Cabinet Secretary instead. When we put
it to the latter that the Prime Minister's Press Secretary, also
a special adviser, had given evidence in to the Committee in 1998,
Sir Richard replied: 'I think Alastair Campbell's evidence, and
your invitation to him, was framed in a way which was very directly
relevant to the Government Information and Communications Service
into which you were, at that time, conducting a review. In terms
of what Jonathan Powell does ... that was in terms of his own
role, in a way which I do not think you were examining Alastair
Campbell'.[40]
As we were examining the role of special adviser, this seemed
to us to be an unconvincing reason for his non-appearance.
22. It may be that the work of advisers has changed
somewhat since it was undertaken by the former advisers we interviewed
(Dr Plowden, Lord Blackwell and Lord Lipsey). Certainly the FDA
though it had, particularly in respect of the 'work done by Alastair
Campbell and his team'. [41]
However, our inability to take evidence from current advisers
made it difficult for us to assess to what extent the role may
have changed. This has made our work more difficult and less complete
than it should have been. In the case of No 10 Downing Street,
where the greatest number of advisers is to be found, the fact
that the Committee's invitation both to the Prime Minister and
to the Chief of Staff have been declined make it especially difficult
for us to form a view about the role of advisers at the centre
of government.
23. We note that the Seventh Report from the Treasury
and Civil Service Committee in Session 1985-86[42]
contained a list of special advisers with their previous or concurrent
outside occupations. It seems strange that in this respect there
is less transparency than 15 years ago notwithstanding the Seven
Principles of Public Life, of which transparency is one, adumbrated
by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. There may be privacy
and data protection issues here, but the data subjects are able
to give consent. In this instance there would appear to be a clear
conflict between the principles of individual privacy and public
interest transparency which may hamper attempts to join up government.
24. We believe that much of the controversy surrounding
the use of advisers results from this lack of transparency. It
is easy to complain that Ministers are allowing 'callow youths
to usurp the functions of experienced officials'[43]
if little information is made available as to who is advising
Ministers. The issue of transparency, with the related one of
accountability, is one to which we shall return at several points.
We note the FDA's suggestion that individual Ministers should
make clear the role they see particular special advisers undertaking,
in effect a job description.[44]
We believe that it is desirable, in the interests of transparency,
that as much information as possible should be made available
about people who are being paid out of public funds, consistent
with respect for the privacy of individuals, and recommend that
Departments should routinely provide as much information as possible
about who advisers are and what they do.
25. Although we have argued that the question of
the value of advisers is logically prior to the question of their
number, the latter issue inevitably provokes much attention. We
heard a variety of views about the appropriate number of advisers.
Some witnesses thought that there were now too many, of the wrong
kind, in the wrong places. The former Prime Minister, John Major
was convinced of this: 'As far as departmental advisers were concerned,
I was very disillusioned ... I would have cut back on advisers
very dramatically. I think they got out of hand. I think there
are too many of them. I think whatever their individual virtues,
I think as a collective breed they cause more problems these days
for government than they solve'.
26. Several witnesses thought the current number
of advisers was about right. Professor King told us that he 'would
not see a very strong case, as a general proposition, either for
reducing or expanding the role of special advisers'[45].
Although a former member of the Committee on Standards in Public
Life, he disagreed with its recommendation that the number should
be limited. Dr Plowden thought that there was room for at least
as many advisers as there are now[46].
We heard no argument for a substantial increase. Lord Blackwell
suggested that too many might cut Ministers off, not only from
the civil service but from each other and even from the Prime
Minister; and that the appropriate number of policy advisers at
No 10 Downing Street is the number which can comfortably be accommodated
round a table and hold a single conversation because 'if you start
having sub-departments at No10 you have just replicated the problem
of having fragmented ministries'.[47]
27. However, Professor Bogdanor argued that the Prime
Minister might need more, rather than fewer, advisers. He pointed
out that 'at the present time there are three members of the Prime
Minister's Policy Unit and two private secretaries dealing with
education and health. These people also have other responsibilities.
The Departments of Education and Health have I think nine special
advisers between them and thousands of officials helping them.
One will not get the dynamic for education or health reform unless
one has a stronger centre of government'[48].
A former civil servant Kate Jenkins agreed, saying 'I do not think
it is a sensible approach to get terribly worried about 10, 20
or 30 people being added to the Downing Street staff. What is
of more concern is the question of, if you want to change an institution
like the Civil Service, where the driving force has to come from.
All my experience has been that it is the Prime Minister'.[49]
28. The Neill Committee recommended[50]
that the Ministerial Code should be amended to reflect the fact
that 'in certain circumstances a Cabinet Minister may appoint
more than two advisers, and perhaps also to set out the circumstances
in which this may be done' (Recommendation 18), that the Civil
Service Act should contain an overall limit which could only be
exceeded by authority of Parliament (Recommendation 19) that,
pending the introduction of this legislation, Parliament should
be asked to approve a limit (Recommendation 20) and that parliamentary
approval be required for any increase in the number of advisers
with authority over civil servants (Recommendation 21).
29. The Government response to the Neill Committee
recommendations in this respect was somewhat ambiguous. It indicated
its intention that the principle of a limit of two advisers per
Cabinet Minister would remain in force, that it would explain
the reasons for any departure from this, and that it had no plans
to increase the number of advisers with authority over civil servants
(and that the position on these should be clarified when the Ministerial
Code is next revised). It agreed to include a limit on the number
of advisers in the proposed Civil Service Act, but did not address
the question of a debate in the House to approve a limit pending
the introduction of the legislation. While it did say that 'the
appointment of special advisers would continue to be regulated
by the Civil Service Order in Council', this gives no additional
reassurance as to the number of advisers without authority
over civil servants. Furthermore, no firm indication was given
as to when the civil service legislation might be introduced.
Civil service legislation has long been promised, and we believe
that its introduction is now urgent. We would expect to see it
early in the next Parliament.
30. We are not convinced that a formal cap on the
total number of advisers, as recommended by the Neill Committee,
is the most sensible way to proceed. We believe that a better
approach would be for Parliament to vote a sum of money for special
advisers (as it does for Short Money). It would then be for a
government to decide how it wanted to make best use of this allocation
(for example between No 10 and the Departments, between particular
Departments, and between policy advisers and political advisers).
The present rules do not apply at all to No 10. Our approach would
achieve the objective of limitation while allowing more flexibility
in the deployment of special advisers and securing more accountability
to Parliament. We therefore recommend that the limitation of
special advisers should be governed by the sum voted by Parliament
for this purpose.
Different
rules for different tribes?
31. Not all advisers play the same role. Our witnesses
agreed that useful distinctions could be drawn between different
types. Professor King had a 'hunch' that 'there is, at least,
analytic distinction between special advisers in the line departments
and the people who now occupy some of the offices in No.10' and
that the 'second group, the No.10 group, probably ought to be
considered and looked at separately and possibly with different
rules, and different indications of what was appropriate behaviour
for them being worked out'.[51]
He added that 'we make the distinction very familiarly between
specialist policy advisers to ministers... on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, political advisers in the narrower sense. Thinking
about this... it occurs to me that one may want to distinguish
in addition between all those special advisers who work in line
Government departments and who have been there after all for quite
a long time... and the special advisers who now work in No.10
who seem to me to be quite a different tribe of people.[52]
The former Prime Minister, John Major, suggested that it was possible
to distinguish between advisers in the Policy Unit, the structure
in No 10 and the advisers to individual Ministers.[53]
In a paper submitted to the Committee, Leighton Jenkins suggested
that advisers could be classified as executive special advisers
(Campbell, Powell), strategic special advisers working at No 10
Downing Street (in the Policy Unit, the Strategic Communications
Unit and the Social Exclusion Unit), departmental special advisers,
expert advisers, and 'czars'.
32. Much of the criticism we heard centred on the
'political' advisers. John Major told us: 'I think there are too
many occasions when advisers, who have a certain amount of knowledge
of their minister, talk to the media or others and it is then
reported that happens to be the view of their minister. Whether
it is or not, it is not for the adviser to do it and I think the
proliferation of advisers is too great for the advantage. They
may have been very useful to the individual ministers but I think
they were becoming a significant handicap to the Government as
a whole. When I look back with the wonderful wisdom of hindsight
upon the 1990s I do wonder how many of the ministerial spats and
difficulties that suddenly exploded in the media - unbeknown to
me, that I was at terrible loggerheads with someone I was actually
having lunch with at that precise moment, for example - came from
political advisers'.[54]
He subsequently clarified that it was the proliferation of
advisers, not their existence, that he criticised. Michael Heseltine
was even more forthright, declaring that 'all these special advisers,
the political ones, are going to be the Achilles heel...of this
Government before long...I would get them all out. Special advisers
are quite different'.[55]
33. Despite such criticism, and the evidence that
supports it, we accept that political advisers bring skills which
Ministers require and provide an interface with the party in a
way that civil servants cannot. As Dr Plowden put it in his memorandum
'If a Minister believes that a 26-year-old can help him with political
advice and/or liaising with Millbank s/he is entitled to act on
this belief. Events will show if it was misplaced'.[56]
34. Moreover, it is not always possible to distinguish
between political and policy advisers. Although evidence suggests
that where two advisers are in post there is a tendency to use
one for political and the other for policy advice, as Dr Clarke
indicated,[57]
when we asked each Department whether this was so the replies
suggested that it is not invariable practice.[58]
Professor King agreed that there was 'overlap between the roles
of providing policy and political advice'. Although the distinction
between political and policy advisers is clearly a useful one,
in practice there are policy-skilled political advisers and politically-informed
policy advisers. It is for the government of the day, and for
individual Ministers, to decide what particular mix of skills
they require. Our recommendation (paragraph 53) would better enable
this to be achieved.
35. It may be that an initiative taken in good faith
after the last general election has been counterproductive. Sir
Richard Wilson explained: ' Special advisers have sometimes been
presented in the press as all being spin doctors. The truth is
that there are differences between special advisers. Some of them
are there to provide a link with the Labour Party of the kind
that is described in the Model Contract, some of them do deal
with the media, but some of them are what I would previously have
described as expert advisers, and we abolished that distinction
at the last election. There is a question, I think, as to whether
we were right to do that because some of the special advisers
have visibly no political role at all. To take the Drugs Czar,
Keith Hellawell was recruited through a competition but counts
as a special adviser, and he cannot possibly be presented as some
kind of political spin doctor. The same applies to his assistant.
There are a number of other special advisers, three economic advisers
in the Treasury and a number of others, who I think have been
brought in because they are experts. There are issues there which
arise in relation to the questions you have asked which I think
need to be addressed. I think we need to stand back and take a
thought about how we handle the wish of governments to bring in
experts and whether we can find ways of dealing with that. There
is some confusion in the way we lump them all together'.[59]
He also told us: 'there is no point in forcing someone into a
Special Adviser mould when they could be recruited through normal
Civil Service Commission processes'[60].
We do believe that this lumping together causes unnecessary difficulties
and that there would be advantages in some attempt at separation.
In particular, policy experts of the 'czar' type do not need to
be fitted into the same mould as political advisers. If they are
to play no political role, there seems no good reason why they
should not be recruited under normal civil service procedures
(which of course now provide for much more external competition
of this kind) and we so recommend.
The case of
No 10
36. The advisers at No 10 Downing Street are another
category again, or even a set of sub-categories. The origins of
the Policy Unit lie in the Political Unit established by Harold
Wilson in 1974 (but foreshadowed in 1964-70) to offer more policy
and political advice to the Prime Minister than was available
from the career civil service. It originally consisted of eight
outsiders. Mrs Thatcher initially reduced the number to three
but by 1983 the Unit had grown back to eight, comprising a rough
balance between civil servants and outsiders. Tony Blair has increased
both the size and the influence of what is now called the Policy
Unit. According to Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, the Unit
combined the roles of 'a think-tank (working up policy and seeking
ideas from outside the policy specialist) and a French-style cabinet
(reinforcing the political direction of the Prime Minister...a
Unit member sat on each of the twenty or so departmental review
teams set up under the Comprehensive Spending Review and attended
Blair's meeting with the minister to agree the terms of the department's
final allocation'.[61]
Almost all the senior members are outsiders.[62]
The strength, though not necessarily the composition, of the Unit
is consistent with the Government's emphasis on 'joining up' government.
37. The strength of the Policy Unit concerned some
witnesses, particularly Professors Hennessy and Hazell. The latter
commented: 'Peter [Hennessy] is quite right about emphasising
the importance... of the Policy Unit in No 10 as being one of
the nodal points in the special adviser network, that too has
doubled. It used to consist of about eight and a mix, roughly
equal proportions, of outsiders and civil servants. It has doubled,
there are now some 14, but they are almost all outsiders... That
is one of the main reasons why the Policy Unit does not integrate
well with the rest of Whitehall, it links to the other special
advisers in the Departments'.[63]
However, even John Major, who was critical of departmental special
advisers, told us that he would have strengthened the Unit somewhat,
even if not to the same extent and with a mixture of civil servants
and outsiders.[64]
The Government Reply to the Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards
in Public Life made it clear that the government has no plans
to increase the size of the Unit. It is difficult to judge the
extent to which the Policy Unit, in its present size and composition,
brings greater strategic direction and better co-ordination to
the operation of government.
38. The total number of advisers in No 10 Downing
Street, with their responsibilities, is set out in Appendix 5
to the Minutes of Evidence. We were also supplied with an organogam[65].
Many work in the area of communications. These posts would not
appear to be very dissimilar from positions in the Government
Information and Communications Service and we question whether
they really need to be filled by special advisers. The whole area
of communications is a difficult one, especially the line between
effective communication of policy and party propaganda. There
might seem to be advantages for government in having special advisers
in this area but such advantages will soon disappear if the information
disseminated comes to be seen as partial or unreliable. We hope
to return to this subject. Meanwhile, we recommend that
the Government consider whether these posts really need to be
classified as special adviser posts or whether they too could
be subject to open competition.
39. Discussion of special advisers, centring as it
so often does on their role in 10 Downing Street, tends to open
debate on whether there should be or indeed is (by stealth according
to Professor Hennessy, 'de facto' according to Dr Plowden[66])
a Prime Minister's Department. In our view it would be much better
if there were less coyness in engaging in what is a perfectly
proper debate on this matter. A Prime Ministers's Department may
or may not be the most appropriate means to strengthen strategic
capacity and co-ordination in British government, but the issues
are important and deserve to be explored. We plan to return to
this matter in reporting on our current inquiry into Making Government
Work.
The Short
Money connection?
40. Special advisers assist Ministers at public expense.
Opposition parties represented in the House of Commons receive
financial assistance for the conduct of their parliamentary business.
This money is known as 'Short Money' after the Leader of the House
who introduced it. A connection between special advisers and Short
Money was drawn first by Lord Neill, who said 'one of the things
I had been thinking about myself was whether you could have a
type of Short Money scheme for special advisers'.[67]
Lord Lipsey offered a proposal: 'There is money for the Opposition,
Short Money... what I think is uncomfortable about the present
situation is that special advisers, and here I really refer to
the political breed of special advisers, are paid just like they
were any other civil servant out of the same pocket without any
discrimination. What I would like to see is, as it were, a vote
of Short Money for Government where it is not very much money
but it would be subject to proper parliamentary control and scrutiny
and would send a signal to people that these people are something
really quite different from the normal Civil Service'.[68]
We decided to investigate further the suggested analogy between
expenditure on Short Money and special advisers, the cost of each
now being broadly equivalent since the Government's substantial
increase in Short Money funding for opposition parties which the
House agreed in May 1999. As a matter of courtesy, since the matter
affects the House, we wrote to the Speaker, and the correspondence
is printed as Annex 3 to this Report.
41. We held one evidence session on Short Money.
We took evidence from the Clerk of the House (Mr William McKay)
and the Head of Operations, Fees Office (Mr Archie Cameron), from
the accountants who provide the audit certificates in respect
of Short Money for the three largest parties, and from representatives
of the parties themselves. We included the Labour Party in our
evidence because, although not currently in receipt of Short Money,
they did receive it until 1997 and they and their auditors were
in a position to tell us their impression of the system and how
they had handled it.
42. The representatives of those parties who gave
us evidence on 15th November did not see a parallel between Short
Money and special advisers. Ben Williams, for the Liberal Democrats
said: 'I am not convinced that there is a parallel between the
increase in the number of special advisers and the funding available
to the parties through Short Money'. Margaret McDonagh, for the
Labour Party, said: 'It is not something that we have debated
but I support the position of both special advisers and the allocation
of Short money to opposition parties. However, I do not think
they are in any way linked. Special advisers are there to give
political advice to Cabinet Ministers'. David Prior MP, for the
Conservatives, specifically denying the suggestion that special
advisers and Short Money could be equated, said: 'The purpose
of Short Money is to enable the opposition party to try and level
the playing field against the government so that we have some
real effort to hold them to account, given the tremendous resources
that they have with press officers and the like' and 'Short Money
... is nothing to do with special advisers. Special advisers are
in addition to that.'[69]
43. The evidence we heard about Short Money revealed
some concerns about the method of accounting for it. As the sums
involved are now substantial, we believe these concerns deserve
the attention of the House.
44. The payment of Short Money is governed by Resolution
of the House. The latest Resolution, passed in May 1999, increased
the overall amount payable by 270 per cent, (the cost in 1999-2000
was £4,863,000,[70]
with a maximum for 2000-2001 of £5,012,182[71])
and altered the payment basis. Whereas previously it had been
necessary for the parties to put in a claim, payment is now made
by the Fees Office provided that within nine months after the
end of the financial year a certificate from the firm of accountants
appointed by the party is received stating that 'the financial
assistance received and claimed was expended on expenses incurred
exclusively in connection with the party's parliamentary business'.
If no certificate were received, no more money would be paid.
The National Audit Office scrutinises all certificates as part
of its annual audit of the Members' Salaries etc Vote Appropriation
Account, but does not take its audit beyond this.[72]
The Clerk of the House and the Head of the Fees Office made it
clear that they were bound by the terms of the Resolution of the
House and could not go beyond it.[73]
45. There has been some discussion as to what, exactly,
constitutes 'parliamentary business', which Parliament has identified
as the purpose of Short Money but which none of the Resolutions
have attempted to define. According to Brian Taylor of PricewaterhouseCoopers,
who were appointed to audit Short Money for the Conservative Party
after the 1997 General Election, 'we approached the Fees Office
in the first year that we were asked to sign an opinion of the
use of Short Money. We gathered from that there was no definition,
which is why we then asked the party to form a definition, which
was very open and was made part of our opinion that we gave. What
we recommended to the party was that, rather than having their
own definition being attached to our opinion it would be far better
to have something that had been sanctioned by the Fees Office.
It was the party who approached the Fees Office to discuss whether
that could be achieved'.[74]
46. The Fees Office Memorandum continues the story:
'the auditor for the Official Opposition's Short Money account
expressed difficulty in certifying that Short Money had been spent
on parliamentary business. In response to this, a definition was
drafted by the Fees Office and circulated for comment and final
approval by the Official Opposition, the Accounting Officer and
the National Audit Office. This definition has now been agreed
and included in the "Notes for the Auditor" which form
part of the re-written audit certificate. Parliamentary business
for the purpose of Short Money is now defined as: Research associated
with front bench duties, developing and communicating alternative
policies to those of the Government of the day, and shadowing
the Government's front bench. It does not include political campaigning
and similar partisan activities, political fund raising, membership
campaigns or personal or private business of any kind'.[75]
The Clerk of the House said that he thought that rather than defining
'parliamentary business' the House authorities had attempted to
describe it.[76]
47. There was some disagreement as to whether, and
if so when, the expanded description of 'parliamentary business'
had been conveyed to the other parties. The representatives of
the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties told us in our evidence
of 15th November that they had only just heard of it,[77]
but Mr Cameron told us, in a note subsequent to the meeting that
'all parties had been informed in August 2000 when the new pro-forma
audit certificate and the new Notes for the Auditor were sent
out from the Fees Office'.[78]
48. The current system is open to the criticism that
it places the onus on the political parties rather than on either
House authorities or firms of accountants to say that the money
has been properly spent, although it is not clear that the previous
system was much more transparent. When we suggested to
Mr McKay and Mr Cameron that previously they would have seen detailed
claim forms, they explained that this was not the case.[79]
Mr Cameron explained that even the requirement to produce a contract
of employment would not of itself provide conclusive evidence
that someone was carrying out the work.[80]
They felt that detailed claim forms would help, but were doubtful
how much. The firms of accountants also agreed that demanding
the submission of more detailed claims would probably create a
good deal of work without greatly improving the system. According
to Robert Ward of Silver Altman, auditing for the Liberal Democrats,
'it would involve a lot of administration and it would obviously
make our task easier. Where do you stop? Are you going to insist
that every claim is backed up with an invoice? There has to be
an element of trust at some stage'.[81]
49. Nonetheless, all the witnesses thought there
was room for more guidance. Mr Ward said, and the other two firms
agreed, 'I think probably a more detailed definition of what expenditure
is acceptable and what expenditure is unacceptable would be adequate'.[82]
The Clerk of the House thought the system could be improved, first
by moving the House to clarify the resolution and second, possibly
by getting more details and assurances from the parties.[83]
Furthermore, he would 'welcome from whatever source- whether the
House or the political parties - some more precision, some more
reassurance which ran right through the system, as indeed I see
in the present suggestions in the Political Parties, Elections
and Referendums Bill for policy development. There is an audit
structure there.'[84]
50. We suggested to the political parties that it
might be appropriate to publish the accounts of how they spent
Short Money. All agreed in principle.[85]
We note that the Official Opposition[86]
and its auditors[87]
were unable to give a categorical assurance that its Short Money
funding was used exclusively for parliamentary business. We have
further concerns that, after an approach by the Party to the Fees
Office, a description of parliamentary business was arrived at,
without consideration by the House, which seems to allow more
latitude in how this money is spent. In particular we are not
clear how 'communicating alternative policies to those of the
Government of the day' (which is permitted under the expanded
description) is different from 'political campaigning' (which
is not).
51. We believe that there is an urgent need for stricter
regulation as to what Short money may be spent on and more transparency
as to how it has been spent. We understand that it will be for
the Leader of the House to bring forward an amended Resolution
for adoption by the House. We asked the Clerk of the House to
draw her attention to the evidence we took and he undertook to
do so.[88]
We hope that the Leader of the House will take an early opportunity
to table an amended resolution so that the House can agree more
precisely on what Short Money may be spent and how it is to be
accounted for.
52. Special support for public funding for parties
in government and special support for parties in opposition are
clearly beasts of the same field. Nothing we heard in our evidence
on Short Money dissuaded us from our view that it might be possible
to put advisers and Short Money on a more open and equal footing.
We put to Sir Richard Wilson and also to the FDA witnesses the
suggestion that the time had perhaps come to separate special
advisers from civil servants and to pay them from a separate fund.
Both disagreed. Sir Richard said 'I think the taxpayer benefits
and the Government benefits, because if they are the best person
for the job the public can be satisfied that the resources are
not being used for the benefit of a political party. For the rest,
taking Special Advisers as a whole, I think the disciplines which
we have for the Civil Service are good ones. I think that Parliament
and you as a Select Committee can get some reassurance that the
disciplines as they are defined in the Model Contract and in the
other provisions of the Civil Service Guidance provide you with
some reassurance that the role of Special Advisers is not going
wrong or getting out of hand. I do not know that I would advise
you to dispense with that kind of assurance. If you had a group
of people funded from a pot who were not in any way civil servants,
you would not be able to look to me as Head of the Civil Service
for the kind of assurance you have been looking to me for just
now. You would be basically strengthening the Government of the
day and the political party in power and I am not sure that is
actually the alteration to the checks and balances which this
Select Committee is looking for. But it is not for me to advise
you; I am trying to think my way into it'.[89]
53. These are clearly important considerations. However,
much of the anxiety about the 'political' special advisers turns
on the extent to which partisan activities are paid for by the
taxpayer and strain civil service rules. The advantage of considering
special advisers and Short Money together is that it opens up
a new approach. It would be possible to fund both political support
to Ministers and parliamentary support to opposition parties out
of a common pot , with agreed rules for both. Instead of regarding
the political advisers to Ministers as a special kind of normal
civil servant, with all the attendant difficulties, it might be
more honest to recognise them as a distinct category, paid for
in a particular way and with distinct contracts governing their
activities. We do not think this necessarily means a loss of discipline;
but it would represent a gain in honesty and transparency. We
recommend that consideration be given to the establishment of
a separate fund out of which both those advisers whom it was not
possible to recruit under civil service rules and Short Money
payments to opposition parties could be funded. Such a fund
would be commensurate with the total sum now paid annually to
non-expert special advisers and in Short money. We recognise that
this would necessitate a change in the accounting procedure in
that it would probably no longer be appropriate for the Clerk
of the House to be involved. If money for special advisers were
voted in a block in this way, it would act as a discipline insofar
as governments would have to decide how it might most usefully
be deployed.
54. Unlike civil servants, most advisers do not have
to be recruited on merit or after competition and this in itself
can cause problems, even for Ministers. The Lord Chancellor has
been taken to an industrial tribunal (unsuccessfully) by women
alleging sex discrimination because they did not have the opportunity
to apply for the post of his special adviser. The principle of
appointment on merit is a safeguard against patronage and its
abuse, and it is not clear to us that special advisers should
be entirely exempt from its application.
55. We accept that an adviser must be personally
congenial to the Minister, but see no reason why this cannot be
combined with a basic merit test under Nolan procedures. Sir Richard
Wilson's point about the public needing reassurance that they
are 'the best person for the job'[90]
is relevant here. There could and should also be advertising of
the posts (as is done by the National Assembly for Wales[91])
while giving the Minister the final choice between the suitably
qualified candidates. Such steps would provide some degree of
assurance on the qualities and qualifications of the advisers
paid for out of public funds without unduly restricting ministerial
freedom. We recommend accordingly.
Special advisers
and civil servants
56. Much criticism of the use of special advisers,
and in particular of the increase in their numbers, centres on
their likely effect on the wider civil service. Some witnesses
thought that they might threaten, or were already threatening,
that objectivity which many believe to be one of the qualities
which set the British civil service apart from almost every other
and which is held to be one of its chief virtues. Most of our
witnesses paid at least lip-service to this ideal and, while most
said there was not (yet) any evidence that this neutrality was
being affected, there were some expressions of unease.
57. Professor Hazell was one of those who thought
increased numbers had led to a change of role: 'I think this is
a step change compared with previous administrations. I know that
others often say there have always been special advisers going
back to Lloyd George, and it is true, but the numbers are much
greater. They have doubled since 1979...That doubling has led
for the first time to there being a sufficient critical mass of
special advisers that they have started to form an alternative
network. As a result, there is much less sharing of information
with the Civil Service and much less sharing of information between
Departmental Ministers and their civil servants in their Departments
and also with other Government Departments, which is the old classic
role of a private office'.[92]
Lord Lipsey agreed that there might come a moment when advisers
reached such a critical mass but believed that 'we are no-where
near it at the moment'.[93]
58. While Lord Neill's main concern was with probity,
he expressed some concern about the number of advisers,
arguing that numbers and role were inextricably linked .[94]
In his report he referred to 'the argument that if the numbers
of this type of public servant, and their degree of influence,
rise to a point where the influence of the "objective"
public servants is outweighed, the effectiveness of the principle
of objectivity in public life is diminished'.[95]
59. Professor Hennessy was also concerned that the
proliferation of special advisers would undermine the neutrality
of the Civil Service. In his evidence to the Neill Committee he
suggested that 'any signs of professional detachment on the part
of career civil servants can all too easily be interpreted as
'not-one-of-us-ery' by the evangelists of the Blair project who,
not surprisingly, fill the considerable number of special adviser
posts in the various parts of No 10'.[96]
60. Those of our witnesses who, with Professor Hennessy,
felt that special advisers posed a threat to the Civil Service
feared greater politicisation of the policy-making process. Professor
King was unsure that this would necessarily be a bad thing, drawing
a distinction between politicisation and corruption: 'I would
not insist on the point, but you could have a greater degree of
politicisation without having corruption. After all, our system
with civil servants playing such a large role within government
policy-making is an unusual one as the world goes. In most countries
there is a greater degree of politicisation. That is separate
from the issue of corruption. Does our system need to be more
politicised? That does seem to me to be a matter, largely, for
empirical judgment'.[97]
It is certainly the case that the UK is unusual in the extent
to which civil servants engage in policy formulation and, according
to Sir Robin Mountfield, 'the UK remains one of the very few major
civil services in the world which is genuinely politically neutral,
right to the most senior appointments.'[98]
61. The suggestion that the number of advisers is
now sufficient to have an adverse effect on the permanent civil
service was strongly rejected by Sir Richard Wilson, arguing that
'70-odd advisers could not swamp the senior civil service of 3,700
people'.[99]
The argument that advisers are few in number compared to the rest
of the Civil Service is plausible as far as Departments are concerned,
but becomes less convincing in the case of the No 10 advisers.
'Give me a fulcrum, and I will move the earth' remains a telling
observation.
62. The organogram of the No 10 staff provided to
us by Sir Richard Wilson following his evidence[100]
shows Jonathan Powell as Chief of Staff at the apex, with lines
going directly up to him from the Policy Unit, the Press Office
and the Principal Private Secretary. Not having been able to secure
an interview with the Chief of Staff, we asked the Cabinet Secretary
what his role was. In answer to the question 'Is Jonathan Powell
in charge at No 10?' Sir Richard replied 'Yes'. He is the Chief
of Staff.[101]
Subsequently he explained 'what the chart shows you is that Jonathan
Powell has lines going to him from the Press Office and Alastair
Campbell's side of the business. The Policy Unit, which are all
the political advisers and civil servants in that area, also come
under this umbrella. Then the rest of Number 10, which is the
Private Office itself, the Garden Room, the honours and appointments
side and operation of the daytoday management of Number
10, they come under the Principal Private Secretary. What I am
saying to you is that the truth is that the two of them share
out the work in that way.'[102]
This reply introduced ambiguity about the lines of accountability
which the Cabinet Secretary's organogram[103]
had appeared to clear up. It is clearly an extremely significant
role for a special adviser to play.
63. Some witnesses thought that advisers were taking
over roles which had traditionally been fulfilled by civil servants
and that this was questionable. Professor King offered anecdotal
evidence 'that several people, people going to see ministers from
local authorities or interest groups or whatever, have told me
that rather to their surprise they found themselves talking to
a special adviser rather than, as they used to, either to a minister
or an official'.[104]
Lord Neill also commented on the possible doorkeeper role of advisers.
The FDA were also concerned about the possibility of advisers
acting as gatekeepers, Jonathan Baume saying that it is 'not appropriate,
I think, on reflection, that a special adviser acts as the gatekeeper
to a Minister; the core of the way the Civil Service is structured,
the constitutional precedents, all our understanding is that the
relationship is between the civil servant and the Secretary of
State, the Prime Minister, and that is something we think is important,
if we are to use the special adviser system effectively.[105]
If communications traditionally received by civil servants were
being intercepted by special advisers this would not be good practice,
but the FDA had not been given instances of this having happened.
They had advertised in the union's journal for examples but had
received none.[106]
Lord Lipsey had heard of 'special advisers having more say than
strictly desirable in the drafting of answers to parliamentary
questions'.[107]
In his evidence to the Neill Committee, Lord Butler of Brockwell,
a former Cabinet Secretary, told the Neill Committee that it would
not be appropriate for advisers to usurp the role of the private
office.
64. The amendment of the Civil Service Order in Council
to allow up to three advisers to exercise authority over civil
servants, something formerly forbidden, has caused particular
comment. It was an innovation introduced at the suggestion of
the FDA, but they have subsequently changed their minds. We asked
them to explain why. They said that their original position had
been that it would be helpful to the new Government ('it goes
back on to transition issues'). They now thought that, while they
made no complaint that either post-holder had abused his authority,
the experiment should reach a natural conclusion at the next General
Election. This was partly because they did not think it was necessary,
partly because it contributed to misconceptions about the relationship
between the Press Secretary and the Government Information and
Communication Service and partly because it set a dangerous precedent.
Mr Campbell's authority now derived from the fact that he represented
the Prime Minister rather than his possession of executive powers.[108]
65. As far as the Chief of Staff was concerned, the
FDA were slightly uneasy about this role being performed by an
adviser at all. They also felt that the role of the Chief of Staff
was in itself problematic: 'The fact that, in effect, you now
have two people working in tandem, the Heywood role, the Powell
role, without going into all of the nuances, I do not think seems
to be the ideal way to run Number 10; one can question whether
that has been overall of benefit to the Prime Minister, and only
the Prime Minister can answer that'.[109]
On balance they felt that 'if you start evolving a pattern whereby
even a small number of special advisers take on executive powers,
you are setting a precedent that could then be widened'.[110]
66. We share the reservations about special advisers
exercising executive powers. It was meant to be a helpful development
(just as the shift of the Chief Press Secretary from being a civil
servant to being a special adviser could be seen as serving the
cause of honesty) but it has unhelpful implications for established
relations within government. The role of special advisers should
add to the effectiveness of these relations, not compromise them.
Not only should the experiment not be extended but the existing
arrangements should be reviewed.
67. Special advisers should certainly not be in a
position to influence the careers of permanent civil servants.
The FDA evidence was interesting on this point. Jonathan Baume
told us that he had it on good authority that special advisers
had in some circumstances been present when Ministers interviewed
candidates for civil service jobs and that they had access to
civil service personnel files. Unfortunately he had received the
information in confidence and did not feel able to pass on the
details.[111]
Pace Lord Lipsey,[112]
we cannot think that there can ever be justification for advisers
to have any say in the careers of permanent civil servants. Such
a development would threaten the key civil service principle of
promotion on merit.
68. We asked the FDA what they would do if examples
of abuse came to their attention. They explained that matters
would need to have reached an extreme pass for them to want to
say anything publicly. Their preference would be 'to raise that
with the appropriate people within the civil service and if needs
be with Ministers themselves'.[113]
One consequence of the professional inclination of the service
to consume its own smoke is that it is difficult for outsiders
to know if there really is a problem. A proper vigilance is therefore
the appropriate stance.
69. A particular area of potential tension between
advisers and civil servants arises in respect of the Government
Information and Communication Service and we return to this when
considering the terms of employment of advisers (paragraph 76).
70. It is not unknown for special advisers to become
established civil servants. In 1995 Peter Levene (now Lord Levene
of Portsoken ), who had been special adviser to Michael Heseltine
the Secretary of State for Defence, was made Chief of Defence
Procurement in 1985 (an appointment which caused some controversy).
Terry Burns, now Lord Burns, who had been Chief Economic Adviser
to the Treasury and also Head of the Government Economic Service
from 1980 to 1991 became Permanent Secretary at the Treasury in
1991 (though the Chief Economic Adviser might be thought of as
policy rather than a political adviser). More recently Geoff Mulgan,
formerly an adviser to the Prime Minister, was appointed to head
the Performance and Innovation Unit at the Cabinet Office, and
David Blunkett's special adviser has also become a civil servant.
These recent appointments were made under the normal civil service
appointment process.[114]
The appointment of Ed Balls as Chief Economic Adviser to the Treasury
while remaining political adviser to the Chancellor has been the
subject of some comment. As Treasury Adviser he is supposed to
offer impartial economic advice while as a political adviser he
does not have to observe the Civil Service rule of political neutrality.[115]
We see no difficulty in these appointments, (as long as they are
made under the normal civil service process) as greater movement,
both inwards and outwards, is one of the aims for the civil service.
However, appointments of this kind do raise questions about whether
at least some expert policy advisers should not be recruited as
civil servants in the normal way.
71. There is a further question concerning the subsequent
career history of special advisers. In view of the restrictions
placed on former civil servants in terms of what they may do when
they leave the service, and the fact that following the First
Report of the Nolan Committee advisers were brought within these
same Business Appointments procedures, it would be interesting
to learn what monitoring the Cabinet Office carries out to ensure
that former advisers do not use knowledge gained in government
in an inappropriate way. The routine publication of information
about subsequent employment would be one way to provide reassurance
on this point.
What are
the boundary lines?
72. Special advisers are paid out of public funds
and there must therefore be accountability to Parliament for them.
We asked Sir Richard Wilson where the ultimate accountability
to Parliament for the work of an adviser lay and he replied 'With
the Prime Minister...I support him on that'. When asked if he
acted as the eyes and ears of the Prime Minister in that regard
he replied that 'he certainly had a responsibility'.[116]
He confirmed that Parliament would be entitled to look for an
answer from him if advisers had broken the rules. The Cabinet
Secretary apart, witnesses felt that special advisers were insufficiently
accountable, either individually or collectively, to Parliament.
Professor Hazell said 'special advisers generally do need to be
subject to rather greater control and accountability'.[117]
The Neill Committee found that whereas all the other actors, both
Ministers and civil servants, were subject to some kind of code
....the special advisers were subject to nothing other than their
contract of employment'. This led the Committee to conclude that
'because of the dual nature of a special adviser as a personal,
political appointee of a Minister but subject also to control
by the Permanent Secretary through adherence to the Civil Service
Code, the lines of accountability and ownership can appear less
than clear'.[118]
We agree.
73. The Government's response to the Neill Committee
explained that 'Special advisers are civil servants. They are
subject to the same rules of conduct as other civil servants as
set out in the relevant staff handbook, with the exception of
the rules relating to political impartiality and objectivity.
The appointing Minister appoints on behalf of the Crown, administration
of the contract falls to the Permanent Secretary, acting on behalf
of the Minister. Cases of difficulty or disagreement should be
submitted to the Prime Minister for decision'. We received no
evidence on any such cases of difficulty, but it is clearly important
that there should be a proper procedure for dealing with them
if they do occur.
74. As for the Model Contract for Special Advisers,
the Neill Committee found a number of faults with it as a means
of holding special advisers to account. For one thing, it is not
applied unchanged to all advisers and 'it is understood that there
are variations from the model contract in the individual contracts
of a number of special advisers' and 'there is no way of confirming
whether these variations are minor or substantial' and so 'there
is no single public point of reference for anyone seeking to hold
a special adviser to account'.[119]
He also pointed out significant omissions from the Contract, including
the absence of any reference to media contacts, and noting that
nowhere in either Contract or Civil Service Code is there any
reference to a requirement on advisers to refrain from asking
civil servants to do anything which would compromise their neutrality.
We further note that the Model Contract states that an adviser
may take a grievance either to the Minister or to
the Permanent Head of the Department, which seems to us ambiguous.
The Neill Committee's preferred solution (Recommendations 22 to
25) was a Code of Conduct for special advisers which would 'Consolidate
the appropriate elements of the Civil Service Code, the Model
Contract and paragraph 56 of the Ministerial Code, which sets
out the duty to uphold the political impartiality of the civil
service and other obligations'.[120]
This Code would be included in the proposed Civil Service Act
and would be enforced by the permanent Heads of Department. We
endorse the Neill Committee's recommendations on the need for
a Code of Conduct for Special Advisers.
75. In Session 1997-98 we produced a Report on 'The
Work of the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS)'[121]
. In that report we examined concerns that had been expressed
as to whether the Prime Minister's Chief Press Secretary had been
using his office to forward the interests of the Government in
a way inappropriate to someone paid from public funds as a special
adviser. We found no evidence to substantiate this at that time
and nor was any submitted when we took further evidence from the
service in May last year.[122]
Since then Alastair Campbell has been reminded by Sir Richard
Wilson of the relevant guidelines. In our 1997-98 Report we said
'it is difficult to avoid some advantage naturally accruing to
the party in power from the use of public money to present the
Government's policies in their best light'. That remains the intractable
fact. We note that the FDA told us in the course of this inquiry
that it was not a completely new concept having a special adviser
in the role of Chief Press Secretary and that it was not necessarily
inappropriate to do so.[123]
Whether it is wise for a government to fill the post in this way
is another matter. We welcomed then and welcome now Sir Richard's
repeated assurances that he remained vigilant to ensure that advisers
do not overstep the mark, but we note that the GICS handbook says
little or nothing about the Service's relation to advisers and
recommend that the next edition should set out the relationship
in more detail. Tensions in this area are inevitable, which is
why continuing vigilance is appropriate in policing the boundary
line.
76. Last Session we followed up our Fourth Report
of Session 1997-98 by taking further evidence from the Head of
the Government Information and Communication Service, Mike Grannatt.
We asked him whether there was tension between advisers and his
officers. He replied that it varied, saying 'there are Departments,
and I have worked alongside special advisers in such Departments,
where the relationship has been very good and very productive.
Occasionally special advisers feel very strongly that a particular
course should be pursued in the communication sense and will argue
the case pretty strongly with the communication people and the
decision will then go to Ministers'[124].
We believe that, though we heard no evidence of specific problems,
there is a need for particular vigilance in this area and we
particularly endorse the Neill Committee's criticisms of the Model
Contract insofar as it fails to mention relations between advisers
and the GICS, and believe that the proposed Code of Conduct for
Special Advisers should give clear guidance on this matter.
77. The Government gave a qualified acceptance to
the Neill Committee's recommendations on this matter. It agreed
to a separate Code but felt that a separate Model Contract would
still be necessary, which seems to us to be sensible. It agreed
that 'pending the introduction of the Civil Service legislation
the Government will amend the Civil Service Order in Council after
the next election to give legislative backing to the current Code
and will ensure that the new arrangements make clear where special
advisers are and are not covered by standard civil service terms'[125].
It gave no undertaking, however, that there would be full parliamentary
consideration of the proposed Code in the period before the civil
service legislation is introduced. We would expect to see a draft
of the Code at an early stage. We welcome the Government's
invitation to us to comment on the proposed Special Advisers Code
although such an invitation should not be seen as a substitute
for a full parliamentary debate, which should take place at the
earliest opportunity.
78. The services of advisers (apart from the unpaid
ones) are provided at public expense, and restrictions are placed
on their political activities. In particular, advisers are prohibited
from taking part in the work of their party's national organisation;
and although they may continue, during elections, to give specialist
or political advice to their Ministers, they must be careful not
to take any active part in the campaign going beyond the provision
of such advice and they 'must not take public part in political
controversy...and they would not normally speak in public for
their Minister or Department'.[126]
79. Professor King raised the question of whether
it was true, 'as is sometimes alleged, that some part-time special
advisers are taking advantage in the rest of their time of knowledge
and contacts gleaned as special advisers? Is it the case that
special advisers are spending their time on party political matters
at the taxpayers' expense, which they ought not to be doing?'.[127]
This suggestion was made particularly in the context of part-time
advisers, but it could equally apply to full-time ones. This appears
to be a very grey area, policed only by the permanent civil service.
We asked Sir Richard Wilson about a recent, well-publicised case
where the Chief Press Secretary had been involved in the defection
of a prominent member of the Official Opposition to the Labour
Party. Sir Richard explained that when the first meeting had been
mooted it had not been clear what the object was, so that it had
been held in No10, during office hours. Subsequent meetings had
been held off the premises in Mr Campbell's own time. Sir Richard
added: 'my concern is that the resources of the state are not
to be used for party political purposes. The tax-payer is paying
Alastair Campbell to work for the Government as the Government,
not the Labour Party. My concern therefore is that in his hours
at work he is doing work for the Government qua Government.
What he does in his own time to support the Labour Party is his
own business, as he is entitled to do'.[128]
80. The distinction between an adviser on duty and
an adviser off-duty is a fine one to draw, especially in the context
of a 24-hour news culture. It is hard to see how an individual
could erect sufficient Chinese walls between what he or she knows
and does through current employment and through other means. Mr
Campbell's intention to resign his employment as soon as a general
election is called to work full time for the Labour Party, then
return to his post in the event of a Labour victory, is one example
of the difficulties. The question is whether there could be a
better system. We asked Lord Neill whether it might be possible
to distinguish between the work done by advisers for the government
and work done for the party and pay them pro rata. He said that
he did not know what each of the advisers in post during his inquiry
actually did, not having seen their individual contracts, so he
did not know how much party work they did but he thought that,
for practical reasons, such a scheme would be hard to implement.
He said 'I would need to see more evidence as to how it could
be done, how it would be workable, how you could partition a day
of a special adviser, so much was party political and so much
was not. The telephone would ring: "Am I allowed to take
another call today? Is that a party political call?" I am
not making a joke of it, but it would be incredibly difficult
to draw a line, a division such as you suggest'.[129]
Such difficulties are inescapable. They would, of course, disappear
if advisers were paid out of party funds, but this would be at
odds with our view that policy and political advice to Ministers
is a proper activity that is appropriately funded by the public
purse. Moreover, other difficulties would arise. Tensions and
boundary disputes are inevitable, which is why proper policing
and codes of conduct are important.
81. All the available evidence suggests that special
advisers can make a positive contribution to good government.
In particular, they broaden the range of policy advice upon which
Ministers can draw. None of this need be threatening to the traditional
role of the civil service. Advisers should be seen as augmenting
this role, not diminishing it. However, we believe that it is
time to put the position of special advisers on a firmer footing.
This means recognising them as a distinct category; funding them
in an appropriate way; appointing them on merit; and putting a
proper framework of accountability around their activities. This
is what our recommendations are designed to achieve. Special advisers
are now an established part of government. The time has come to
recognise this in the way they are treated.
| (a) | We recommend that the limitation of special advisers should be governed by the sum voted by Parliament for this purpose (paragraph 30). |
| (b) | We recommend that wherever possible special advisers who are to play no potential role should be recruited under normal civil service procedures (Paragraph 35). |
| (c) | We recommend that the Government consider whether staff working in the area of communications really need to be classified as special advisers or whether they could be subject to open competition (paragraph 38). |
| (d) | We hope that the Leader of the House will take an early opportunity to table an amended resolution so that the House can agree more precisely on what Short Money may be spent and how it is to be accounted for (paragraph 51). |
| (e) | We recommend that consideration be given to the establishment of a separate fund out of which both those advisers whom it was not possible to recruit under civil service rules and Short Money payments to opposition parties could be funded. (Paragraph 53). |
| (f) | We recommend that special adviser posts should be publicly advertised and the Minister given the final choice between suitably qualified candidates (paragraph 55). |
| (g) | The experiment of giving up to three special advisers authority over civil servants should not be extended and the existing arrangements should be reviewed (paragraph 66). |
| (h) | We agree with the Neill Committee that the lines of accountability, and overlap in respect of special advisers can appear less than clear (paragraph 72). |
| (i) | We endorse the Neill Committee's recommendations on the need for a Code of Conduct for Special Advisers. (Paragraph 74). |
| (j) | We particularly endorse the Neill Committee's criticisms of the Model Contract insofar as that fails to mention relations between advisers and the GICS, and believe that the proposed Code of Conduct for Special Advisers should give clear guidance on this matter (paragraph 76). |
| (k) | We welcome the Government's invitation to us to comment on the proposed Special Advisers Code although such an invitation should not be seen as a substitute for a full parliamentary debate, which should take place at the earliest opportunity (paragraph 77). |
| Name of Department | Special Advisers | Information received/declined/unavailable |
| MAFF | Age, names and work history supplied; no CVs. Responsible for policy advice. | |
| DCMS | CVs received. Political advisers rather than technical experts. | |
| Ministry of Defence | CVs declined; areas of policy interest given. Declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee. | |
| DfEE | Areas of responsibility given; no CVs. 4 political advisers;1 policy expert. (2 part-time). | |
| DETR | Name, and area of responsibility given. | |
| FCO | Brief career history supplied. Both policy advisers. | |
| Home Office | Role and biog details supplied including press release announcing appointment of Special Adviser to Home Secretary. 1 political adviser; 1 policy adviser. | |
| Lord Chancellor's
Department |
CV supplied. Recruited for technical expertise but also undertook political liaison role. | |
| DfID | 1 position vacant. No distinction drawn between technical expert and political adviser role. Declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee. | |
| DSS | Areas of policy interest covered; biog details not supplied. Declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee. | |
| DTI | Areas of interest given; advisers provide policy and presentational advice. Declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee. | |
| Cabinet Office and
10 Downing Street | Names, titles and responsibilities provided; declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee | |
| Scotland Office | Names and titles provided. Responsibilities for policy and presentation; declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee. (Volunteered 1 further adviser part-time and unpaid). | |
| Leader of the
House of Lords | Names and policy areas covered; declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee. | |
| Govt Chief Whip | Names given; areas of responsibility not given. Declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee. | |
| Leader of the House | Names, age, educational qualifications and brief career history supplied. | |
| Wales Office | Both policy advisers. Declined to provide career history and personal details since they are confidential between employer and employee. | |
| DoH | Areas of responsibility given as 1 policy adviser and 1 political and presentational adviser; CVs provided with agreement of advisers | |
| HM Treasury | List of names, job titles and areas of responsibility given. Policy advice and media relations. | |
| Total |
Letter of reply from Sir Richard Wilson, KCB
1 August 2000
Thank you for your letters of 19 and 20 July seeking
information on the age and career history of Special Advisers
along with a description of their individual work responsibilities.
All special advisers are appointed under terms and
conditions set out in the Model Contract for Special Advisers.
As requested, I enclose a list of the special advisers working
in No 1 and the Cabinet Office together with a breakdown of their
individual responsibilities. Sir Richard does not feel however
that he can agree to provide information relating to the educational
qualifications and career history of the individuals concerned.
This is personal information between the employer and employee
which we would not supply about permanent civil servants, and
it is not for departments to make public information that has
been given in confidence.
Sir Richard Wilson, KCB
1 August 2000
SPECIAL ADVISERS IN No 10 AND THE CABINET OFFICE AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES
| No 10 | |
| Jonathan Powell | Chief of Staff |
| Kate Garvey | Diary |
| Anji Hunter | Presentation and Planning |
| Fiona Millar | Assistant to Mrs Blair |
| Policy Unit | |
| David Milliband | Head of Policy Unit |
| Andrew Adonis | Education, Freedom of Information, |
| Robert Hill | Health, Social Services, Drugs |
| (shared with Liz Lloyd) | |
| Peter Hyman | Communications Co-ordinator |
| Roger Liddle | Europe, Defence |
| Liz Lloyd | Home Affairs, MAFF, Drugs |
| (shared with Robert Hill) | |
| Geoff Mulgan | Inequality, Social Exclusion, Welfare to Work, Family, Urban Policy, Voluntary Sector |
| Geoffrey Norris | Trade and Industry, Employment, Planning, Food Safety |
| James Purnell | DCMS, Internet, Modernising Government |
| Ed Richards | Strategy Development |
| Derek Scott | Economy (including EMU) |
| Carey Oppenheim | Welfare Issues, Child Policy, The Elderly, Women |
| No 10 Press Office | |
| Alastair Campbell | |
| Hilary Coffman | |
| Phil Murphy | |
| Carl Sobhan | |
| Chris McShane | |
| Strategic Communications Unit | |
| Phil Bassett | |
| David Bradshaw | |
| Research and Information Unit | |
| Bill Bush | |
| Katherine Rimmer | |
| Bob Bartram | |
| Cabinet Office | |
| Nigel Warner | Drugs, GMOs, Regulation, Rural Issues |
| Andrew Lappin | Modernising Government, Civil Service, IT, Social Exclusion, Equality |
| Keith Hellawell | UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordinator |
| Mike Trace | Deputy UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordinator |
Letter from Sir Richard Wilson, KCB of 4 August
2000 about the role of special advisers
I have seen your letter of 17 July to Jonathan Powell,
inviting him to give evidence as part of the Committee's inquiry
into the role of special advisers. Mr Powell has consulted the
Prime Minister who has asked me to reply to you.
The convention is that civil servants account to
Parliament on behalf of their Ministers. They have no formal accountability
of their own to Parliament (unless they are Accounting Officers)
and they do not give evidence on their own behalf. The Government
does not therefore consider it appropriate for Jonathan Powell
or any other special adviser to give evidence essentially about
themselves and their own role, particularly alongside Lord Blackwell
who as former civil servant will only be able to provide evidence
in a private and personal capacity.
The Prime Minister has therefore asked me to say
that he would wish me to give evidence instead of Jonathan Powell
and any other serving special adviser whom the Committee may wish
to invite, and to answer any questions which the Committee may
have on the government's policy on the role of special advisers
including the exceptional status of Jonathan Powell and Alastair
Campbell. You may wish to add this to the items for the hearing
arranged for 1 November which already includes special adviser
issues. If there are specific additional areas in relation to
special advisers which the Committee would like to address, it
would of course be helpful if you could give me a broad indication
beforehand of what they are.
Sir Richard Wilson, KCB
4 August 2000
Letter from Tony Wright, MP to Madam Speaker
of 29 June
I write to bring to your attention an issue that
the Select Committee has today resolved to investigate.
The Committee had already decided to inquire into
the role of special advisers. It has now resolved to add an examination
of Short Money to this inquiry, believing that this fits naturally
into the general issue of public resources for adviser support
to parties (whether in government or opposition). Our evidence
session with Lord Neill helped to persuade the Committee of this
linkage.
The Committee has therefore taken the view that this
matter falls properly within its terms of reference, but felt
that it would be appropriate to inform you of its decision.
Tony Wright, MP
29 June 2000
Letter from Madam Speaker to Tony Wright, MP
of 5 July 2000
Thank you for your letter of 28 June about the decision
of your committee to add investigation of Short Money to the proposed
inquiry into the role of special advisers.
I am grateful to you for letting me know what has
been decided. It is for committees to interpret their own orders
of reference, subject only to further direction from the House.
Thus, though I am of course interested in the decision, I think
the initiative properly lies with your committee and not with
me.
Madam Speaker
5 July 2000
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE RELATING TO THE REPORT
| Mr David Lepper | Mr Andrew Tyrie |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr Brian White |
| Mr Neil Turner |
The Committee deliberated.
Draft Report (Special Advisers: Boon or Bane?), proposed
by the Chairman, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft
Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
A paragraph- (Mr Michael Trend) - brought
up and read, as follows:
"Despite much excellent work which has gone
into this report, the Committee's inquiry into special advisers
has been fundamentally compromised. The terms of reference of
the Committee set out in Standing Order No 146 are 'to consider
matters relating to the quality and standards of administration
provided by Civil Service departments, and other matters relating
to the Civil Service'. While Short Money is a proper area of investigation
by another House of Commons Select Committee, the Select Committee
on Public Administration has clearly and mischievously operated
outside its terms of reference in investigating Short Money. We
can only conclude that this was done by those motivated by narrow
party political considerations".- (Mr Michael Trend.)
Question put, That the paragraph be read a second
time.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraphs 1 to 11 agreed to.
Paragraph 12 read as follows:
"Lord Neill reported that 'almost all witnesses
made clear their view that special advisers were valuable components
of the machinery of government'. This conclusion reflected those
of a number of studies over more than thirty years and the evidence
we received did nothing to contradict it. None of our witnesses
dissented from this general view. A former adviser, William Plowden,
explained their value: they can 'vicariously multiply Ministers'
contacts with MPs, officials, outside interests and also with
other Ministers, including the Prime Minister; evaluate proposals
and advice coming up from officials; consult sources other than
those favoured by officials; act as an informal sounding board
for a Minister's ideas or anxieties'. Enthusiasts of this view
argue that special advisers form a useful counterweight to what
is sometimes perceived as civil service inertia, but even the
FDA, the civil service trades union representing the grades most
likely to feel threatened by advisers, were sanguine about their
use. In their view the arrangement brought general benefits all
round though there were 'occasional problems with individuals'.
This is a useful reminder that. Whatever the benefits in principle.
Much depends on the quality and contribution of individual advisers.
The FDA also explained how the existence of advisers can help
the smooth functioning of the civil service: 'Within the UK system,
Ministers inevitably need certain tasks undertaking that, were
they performed by civil servants, would take them across a political
line. In practice the current system allows those functions to
be undertaken by special advisers, thus preserving the impartiality
of the civil service. Moreover, a special adviser performing their
job effectively and reflecting the views of their Minister can
assist greatly in the smooth running of the Department'. Nor did
they think there was anything exceptional about the way ministers
in the present Government used advisers, other than that 'Some
of them had placed slightly more emphasis on the role of special
advisers in certain circumstances'. They even agreed that the
number per Minister might possibly be increased from two to three
without resulting in a cabinet system. Lord Lipsey reported
the alarm of one Permanent Secretary, on being told that
his incoming Minister proposed to work without a special adviser.
However, this general agreement on the value of advisers did not
prevent concerns being expressed about some aspects of the present
arrangements. We discuss these concerns shortly".
Amendments made.
Another Amendment proposed, in line 21, after "Department"
to insert the words "although why 'party political' civil
servants, as opposed to party officials outside the Civil Service
are required for his task has never been satisfactorily explained".
-(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.
Paragraphs 13 and 14 agreed to.
Paragraph 15 read, as follows:
"We believe that much of the criticism of the
use of special advisers, concentrating as it does on their numbers,
is misdirected. If they really improve the machinery of government,
then it is clearly sensible to have as many as the system requires.
If they are ineffective, or even damaging, then it is sensible
to cull them. The key question is not how many there are, but
what contribution they make to effective government. When this
is established, the further questions concern the framework and
rules within which they operate. Although we accept the general
evidence on the value of advisers, it would be useful to have
more particular evidence. Unfortunately, because of the limitations
on the information available, it has not been possible for us
to explore this as fully as we would have liked".
An Amendment proposed, in line 1, to leave out from
beginning to word "although" in line 6 and insert the
words "the main criticism of the current crop of advisers
centres first on the highly party political nature of much of
their activity and secondly on the danger that the sheer number
of advisers so close to the most senior ministers in the government
could compromise the traditional advisory role played by the neutral
civil service". -(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Another Amendment proposed, in line 8 to leave out
from the word "evidence" to the end of the paragraph
and insert the words "unfortunately, because of the limited
amount of information provided by the Executive, and its refusal
to allow special advisers to give evidence, it has not been possible
for us to explore the role of special advisers as fully as we
would have liked". -(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraph 16 agreed to.
Paragraph 17 read.
Question put, that the paragraph stand part of the
Report.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 3 | Noes, 2 |
| Mr David Lepper | Mr Michael Trend |
| Mr Neil Turner | Mr Andrew Tyrie |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraphs 18 to 21 agreed to.
Paragraph 22 read, as follows:
"It may be that the work of advisers has changed
somewhat since it was undertaken by the former advisers we interviewed
(Dr Plowden, Lord Blackwell and Lord Lipsey). Certainly the FDA
thought it had, particularly in respect of the 'work done by Alastair
Campbell and his team'. However, our inability to take evidence
from current advisers made it difficult for us to assess to what
extent the role may have changed. This has made our work more
difficult and less complete than it should have been. In the case
of No 10 Downing Street, where the greatest number of advisers
is to be found, the fact that the Committee's invitation both
to the Prime Minister and to the Chief of Staff have been declined
make it especially difficult for us to form a view about the role
of advisers at the centre of government.
Amendment proposed, in linr 1, to leave out the words
"It may be that the work of advisers has changed somewhat"
and insert the words "The work of advisers has changed".
-(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraphs 23 to 29 agreed to.
Paragraph 30 read, as follows:
"We are not convinced that a formal cap on the
total number of advisers, as recommended by the Neill Committee,
is the most sensible way to proceed. We believe that a better
approach would be for Parliament to vote a sum of money for special
advisers (as it does for Short Money). It would then be for a
government to decide how it wanted to make best use of this allocation
(for example between No 10 and the Departments, between particular
Departments, and between policy advisers and political advisers).
The present rules do not apply at all to No 10. Our approach would
achieve the objective of limitation while allowing more flexibility
in the deployment of special advisers and securing more accountability
to Parliament. We therefore recommend that the limitation of
special advisers should be governed by the sum voted by Parliament
for this purpose".
Amendment proposed, in line 2, after the word "is"
to insert the word "necessarily".-(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Another Amendment proposed, in line 3, to leave out
from the word "advisers" to the second word "It"
in line 4.-(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Another Amendment proposed, in line 9, to leave out
from the word "recommend" to the end of the paragraph
and insert the words "consideration should be given to limiting
the number of special advisers by the sum voted by Parliament
for this purpose".-(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Another Amendment proposed, in line 9, to leave out
the word "number" and insert the word "limitation".-(The
Chairman.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 3 | Noes, 2 |
| Mr David Lepper | Mr Michael Trend |
| Mr Neil Turner | Mr Andrew Tyrie |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.
Paragraphs 31 to 33 agreed to.
Paragraph 34 read, as follows:
"Moreover, it is not always possible to distinguish
between political and policy advisers. Although evidence suggests
that where two advisers are in post there is a tendency to use
one for political and the other for policy advice, as Dr Clarke
indicated, when we asked each Department whether this was so the
replies suggested that it is not invariable practice. Professor
King agreed that there was 'overlap between the roles of providing
policy and political advice'. Although the distinction between
political and policy advisers is clearly a useful one, in practice
there are policy-skilled political advisers and politically-informed
policy advisers. It is for the government of the day, and for
individual Ministers, to decide what particular mix of skills
they require. Our recommendation (paragraph 53) would better enable
this to be achieved".
Amendment proposed, in 9, to leave out from the word
"require" to the end of the paragraph.-(Mr Andrew
Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraphs 35 to 39 agreed to.
Paragraph 40 read, as follows:
"Special advisers assist Ministers at public expense. Opposition parties represented in the House of Commons receive financial assistance for the conduct of their parliamentary business. This money is known as 'Short Money' after the Leader of the House who introduced it. A connection between special advisers and Short Money was drawn first by Lord Neill, who said 'one of the things I had been thinking about myself was whether you could have a type of Short Money scheme for special advisers'. Lord Lipsey offered a proposal: ' There is money for the Opposition, Short Money... what I think is uncomfortable about the present situation is that special advisers, and here I really refer to the political breed of special advisers, are paid just like they were any other civil servant out of the same pocket without any discrimination. What I would like to see is, as it were, a vote of Short Money for Government where it is not very much money but it would be subject to proper parliamentary control and scrutiny and would send a signal to people that these people are something really quite different from the normal Civil Service'. We decided to investigate further the suggested analogy between expenditure on Short Money and special advisers, the cost of each now being broadly equivalent since the Government's substantial increase in Short Money funding for opposition parties which the House agreed in May 1999. As a matter of courtesy, since the matter affects the House, we wrote to the Speaker, and the correspondence is printed as Annex 3 to the Minutes of Evidence".
Amendment proposed, in line 14, at the end to add
the words "notwithstanding the fact that consideration of
Short Money is clearly outwith the terms of reference of our Committee,
which are set out in Standing Order 146 and which reads "to
consider matters relating to the quality and standards of administration
provided by Civil Service Departments, and other matters relating
to the Civil Service.""-(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraph 41 agreed to.
Paragraph 42 read, as follows:
"The representatives of those parties who gave
us evidence on 15th November did not see a parallel between Short
Money and special advisers. Ben Williams, for the Liberal Democrats
said: 'I am not convinced that there is a parallel between the
increase in the number of special advisers and the funding available
to the parties through Short Money'. Margaret McDonagh, for the
Labour Party, said: 'It is not something that we have debated
but I support the position of both special advisers and the allocation
of Short Money to opposition parties. However, I do not think
they are in any way linked. Special advisers are there to give
political advice to Cabinet Ministers'. David Prior MP, for the
Conservatives, specifically denying the suggestion that special
advisers and Short Money could be equated, said: 'The purpose
of Short Money is to enable the opposition party to try and level
the playing field against the government so that we have some
real effort to hold them to account, given the tremendous resources
that they have with press officers and the like' and 'Short Money
... is nothing to do with special advisers. Special advisers are
in addition to that."
Amendment proposed, in line 2, after the word "adviser"
to insert the words "all three specifically denied that special
advisers and Short Money could be equated".-(Mr Andrew
Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Another Amendment proposed, line 9, to leave out
from the word "Conservatives" to the word "said"
in line 10.-(Mr Andrew Tyrie).
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraph 43 agreed to.
Paragraph 44 read, as follows:
"The payment of Short Money is governed by Resolution
of the House. The latest Resolution, passed in May 1999, increased
the overall amount payable to £4,863,000, an increase of
270 per cent and altered the payment basis. Whereas previously
it had been necessary for the parties to put in a claim, payment
is now made by the Fees Office provided that within nine months
after the end of the financial year a certificate from the firm
of accountants appointed by the party is received stating that
'the financial assistance received and claimed was expended on
expenses incurred exclusively in connection with the party's parliamentary
business'. If no certificate were received, no more money would
be paid. The National Audit Office scrutinises all certificates
as part of its annual audit of the Members' Salaries etc Vote
Appropriation Account, but does not take its audit beyond this.
The Clerk of the House and the Head of the Fees Office made it
clear that they were bound by the terms of the Resolution of the
House and could not go beyond it".
Amendment proposed, in line 2, to leave out the words
"to £4,863,000, an increase of 270 per cent" and
insert the words "by 270 per cent (the cost in 1999-2000
was £4,863,000 with a maximum for 2000-2001 of £5,012,000)".
-(The Chairman.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 3 | Noes, 2 |
| Mr David Lepper | Mr Michael Trend |
| Mr Neil Turner | Mr Andrew Tyrie |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.
Paragraphs 45 to 49 agreed to.
Paragraph 50 brought up and read, as follows:
"We suggested to the political parties that
it might be appropriate to publish the accounts of how they spent
Short Money. All agreed in principle. We note that the Official
Opposition and its auditors were unable to give a categorical
assurance that its Short Money funding was used exclusively for
parliamentary business. We have further concerns that, after an
approach by the Party to the Fees Office, a description of parliamentary
business was arrived at, without consideration by the House, which
seems to allow more latitude in how this money is spent. In particular
we are not clear how 'communicating alternative policies to those
of the Government of the day' (which is permitted under the expanded
description) is different from 'political campaigning' (which
is not)".
Amendment proposed, in line 2, to leave out from
the word "principle" to the end of line 6.-(Mr Andrew
Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraph 51 agreed to.
Motion made, to leave out paragraphs 52 and 53.-(Mr
Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the paragraphs stand part of the
Report.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 3 | Noes, 2 |
| Mr David Lepper | Mr Michael Trend |
| Mr Neil Turner | Mr Andrew Tyrie |
| Mr Brian White |
Motion made, to leave out paragraphs 54 and 55.-(Mr
Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the paragraphs stand part of the
Report.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 3 | Noes, 2 |
| Mr David Lepper | Mr Michael Trend |
| Mr Neil Turner | Mr Andrew Tyrie |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraphs 56 to 65 agreed to.
Paragraph 66 read, as follows:
"We share the reservations about special advisers
exercising executive powers. It was meant to be a helpful development
(just as the shift of the Chief Press Secretary from being a civil
servant to being a special adviser could be seen as serving the
cause of honesty) but it has unhelpful implications for established
relations within government. The role of special advisers should
add to the effectiveness of these relations, not compromise them.
Not only should the experiment not be extended but the existing
arrangements should be reviewed".
An Amendment made.
Another Amendment proposed, in line 6, to leave out
the word "reviewed" and insert the word "abandoned".
- (Mr Andrew Tyrie)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.
Paragraphs 67 to 74 agreed to.
Paragraph 75 read, as follows:
"In Session 1997-98 we produced a Report on
'The Work of the Government Information and Communication Service
(GICS)'. In that report we examined concerns that had been expressed
as to whether the Prime Minister's Chief Press Secretary had been
using his office to forward the interests of the Government in
a way inappropriate to someone paid from public funds as a special
adviser. We found no evidence to substantiate this at that time
and nor was any submitted when we took further evidence from the
service in May last year. In our 1997-98 Report we said 'it is
difficult to avoid some advantage naturally accruing to the party
in power from the use of public money to present the Government's
policies in their best light'. That remains the intractable fact.
We note that the FDA told us in the course of this inquiry that
it was not a completely new concept having a special adviser in
the role of Chief Press Secretary and that it was not necessarily
inappropriate to do so. Whether it is wise for a government to
fill the post in this way is another matter. We welcomed then
and welcome now Sir Richard's repeated assurances that he remained
vigilant to ensure that advisers do not overstep the mark, but
we note that the GICS handbook says little or nothing about the
Service's relation to advisers and recommend that the next
edition should set out the relationship in more detail. Tensions
in this area are inevitable, which is why continuing vigilance
is appropriate in policing the boundary line".
An Amendment proposed, in line 6, after the word
"year" to insert the words "Since then, Alastair
Campbell has been reprimanded for ignoring Sir Richard's guidelines,
given to this Committee in oral evidence on the limits to his
party political activity". -(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
An Amendment made.
Another Amendment proposed, in line 9, after the
word "fact" to insert the words "particularly with
respect to parliamentary activity, the imbalance which Short Money
was designed largely to address when it was introduced".
-(Mr Andrew Tyrie)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.
Paragraphs 76 to 79 agreed to.
Paragraph 80 read, as follows:
"The distinction between an adviser on duty
and an adviser off-duty is a fine one to draw, especially in the
context of a 24-hour news culture. It is hard to see how an individual
could erect sufficient Chinese walls between what he or she knows
and does through current employment and through other means. Mr
Campbell's intention to resign his employment as soon as a general
election is called to work full time for the Labour Party, then
return to his post in the event of a Labour victory, is one example
of the difficulties. The question is whether there could be a
better system. We asked Lord Neill whether it might be possible
to distinguish between the work done by advisers for the government
and work done for the party and pay them pro rata. He said that
he did not know what each of the advisers in post during his inquiry
actually did, not having seen their individual contracts, so he
did not know how much party work they did but he thought that,
for practical reasons, such a scheme would be hard to implement.
He said 'I would need to see more evidence as to how it could
be done, how it would be workable, how you could partition a day
of a special adviser, so much was party political and so much
was not. The telephone would ring: "Am I allowed to take
another call today? Is that a party political call?" I am
not making a joke of it, but it would be incredibly difficult
to draw a line, a division such as you suggest'. Such difficulties
are inescapable. They would, of course, disappear if advisers
were paid out of party funds, but this would be at odds with our
view that policy and political advice to Ministers is a proper
activity that is appropriately funded by the public purse. Moreover,
other difficulties would arise. Tensions and boundary disputes
are inevitable, which is why proper policing and codes of conduct
are important".
Amendment proposed, in line 1, to leave out the words
"a fine one to draw" and insert the words "little
short of absurd".-(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 2 | Noes, 3 |
| Mr Michael Trend | Mr David Lepper |
| Mr Andrew Tyrie | Mr Neil Turner |
| Mr Brian White |
Paragraph agreed to.
Motion made, to leave out paragraph 81 and insert
the following paragraph
"Special advisers can make a positive contribution
to good government. They can also prejudice the neutrality of
the civil service and provide an unacceptable party political
advantage to the governing party. Both the number of advisers
and the breadth of their party political and other activity are
an increasing cause for concern. Lord Neill's recommendation for
a Code of Conduct is an important start. The Code of Conduct would
enable clear 'rules of engagement' to be provided where advisers
are assuming functions previously performed by civil servants.
Special advisers' contracts should be consonant with the Code
of Conduct and, where they deviate from the model contract that
is already published, put into the public domain. The responsibility
for enforcing the contract should lie with Permanent Secretaries
answerable to Select Committees in Parliament. Special advisers
who are identified as doing a considerable amount of highly party
political work should be paid from party funds and not the taxpayer.
There will always be difficulties of definition and in policing
the line but the widespread perception that over the last decade
advisers have done an increasing amount of highly partisan work
at tax payers' expense is not only constitutionally questionable
but unacceptable to a wider public. The doubling of advisers in
Whitehall since 1997 and, in particular, the tripling of the number
of advisers at the heart of the government in 10 Downing Street,
has made action all the more necessary. This is what the recommendations
of this Report are intended to achieve". -(Mr Andrew Tyrie.)
Question put, That the paragraph stand part of the
Report.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 3 | Noes, 2 |
| Mr David Lepper | Mr Michael Trend |
| Mr Neil Turner | Mr Andrew Tyrie |
| Mr Brian White |
Motion made and Question put, That the report, as
amended, be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 3 | Noes, 2 |
| Mr David Lepper | Mr Michael Trend |
| Mr Neil Turner | Mr Andrew Tyrie |
| Mr Brian White |
Ordered, That the Chairman
do make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That the provisions
of Standing Order No 134 (Select Committees (Reports)) be applied
to the Report.
Several Papers were ordered to be appended to the
Report.
Several memoranda were ordered to be reported to
the House.
12 Cm
3638 (1968) Vol I, p 45 Back
13 HC
Deb 22 January, col 467w Back
14 Vacher's
Parliamentary Companion December 2000 Back
15 Appendix
1; see also Annex 1 Back
16 Unconventional
Civil Servants (2000) (not
printed) Back
19 Fulton
Report 1968, Report from the Expenditure Committee 1976, Report
from Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1985-6, Report from
Treasury Committee 1994 Back
20 HC
(1999-2000) 727 p11 Back
21 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 486 Back
22 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Ev p 105 Back
23 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 486 Back
24 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Ev p 105 Back
25 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 34 Back
26 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 196 Back
27 The
Powers behind the Prime Minister
by Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon 1999 Back
28 Appendix
1 Back
29 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 191 Back
30 HC
(1999-2000) 727-1 Q 22 Back
31 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 546 Back
32 Quoted
in Cmnd 4557 para 6.29 Back
35 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q27 Back
36 Eg
HC Deb (1999-2000) 11 Nov c 825w Back
37 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 1 Back
38 Appendix
2 Back
40 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 403 Back
41 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 478 Back
43 HC
(1999-2000) 727 p 12 Back
44 HC
(1999-2000) 238 p 106 Back
46 HC
(1999-2000) 727 p 12 Back
47 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 63 Back
48 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q159 Back
49 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 159 Back
50 Sixth
Report; Reinforcing Standards Back
51 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 7 Back
52 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 1 Back
53 HC
(1999-2000) 821 Q 12 Back
55 HC
(2000-2001) 94 Q 967 Back
56 HC
(1999-2000) 727 p 12 Back
57 HC
(1999-2000) 94 Q 979 Back
60 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 455 Back
61 The
Powers behind the Prime Minister, 1999 Back
62 For
most of the information in this paragraph we are indebted to House
of Commons Library Research Paper 00/42. Back
63 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 213 Back
64 HC
(1999-2000) 821 Q 12 Back
65 HC
(1999-2000) 238 p 20 and Appendix 1 Back
66 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 58 Back
67 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 11 Back
68 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 27 Back
69 HC
(1999-200) 238 Q 731 Back
70 Appropriation
Accounts 1999-2000 HC 25-XVIII p 24 Back
71 Figures
supplied to House of Commons Library by house of Commons Fees
Office Back
72 HC
(1999-2000) 238 p 120 Back
73 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 502 Back
74 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 583 Back
75 HC
(1999-2000) 238 p 120 Back
76 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 504 Back
77 HC
(1999-2000 238 Q 726-8 Back
78 HC
(1999-2000) 238 p 126 Back
79 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 561-3 Back
80 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 559 Back
81 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 596 Back
82 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 597 Back
83 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 503 Back
84 HC
(1999-2000 238 Q 547 Back
85 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 697) Back
86 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 671 Back
88 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 540 Back
89 HC
(1999-2000) Q 238 Q 455 Back
90 HC (1999-2000) 238 Q 455 Back
91 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 49 Back
92 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 213 Back
93 HC
(1999-2000) 721 Q 35 Back
97 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 6 Back
98 'Civil
Service Change in Britain'
delivered to Political Studies Association Conference April 2000 Back
99 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 136 Back
100 HC
(1999-2000) 238 p 20 Back
101 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 418 Back
102 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 419 Back
103 Appendix
1 Back
104 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 11 Back
105 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 473 Back
106 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 484 Back
107 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 36 Back
108 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 473 Back
109 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 473 Back
111 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 483 Back
112 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 40 Back
113 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q485 Back
114 HC
(1999-2000) 94 Q 858 Back
115 See
Public Service December 1999 Back
116 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q431 Back
117 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 217 Back
121 HC
(1997-98) 770 (Fourth Report) Back
122 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 473 Back
123 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 473 Back
124 HC
(1999-2000) 511 Q 44 Back
125 Cm
4817 p 11 Back
126 Model
Contract Schedule 1 part 1 Back
127 HC
(1999-2000) 727 Q 1 Back
128 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 434 Back
129 HC
(1999-2000) 238 Q 295 Back