Debate on Iraq: Future Strategic Relationship - 14 January 2009

Mr. Adam Holloway (Gravesham) (Con): We are in danger of becoming dewy-eyed over the debacle in Iraq. In this century, we have never had a serious strategy for dealing with Iraq. That was the case as we went into the war and after the war, and I fear that it is also the case today.

The decision to offer UK support to the US invasion was made by the Prime Minister, pretty much alone, in Crawford, Texas in April 2002. The only thing that seemed to be on Tony Blair’s mind at the time was winning influence with the United States, a strategy whose success is now rather in doubt, as we have just heard from my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin).

There is no evidence that before the then Prime Minister went to Crawford, he sought or received any advice from the Ministry of Defence. He is reported to have gone to the chiefs on his return from the UK and said, “Let’s make a plan to support a US invasion.” On the day of the invasion, we still had no agreement with the US on the political end state. Indeed, for the UK, the end state, according to a note from Downing street of 22 October 2002, was for Iraq to become a

For the Americans, the end state seems to have been destroying Saddam’s leadership and his supporting power base. Those are two completely different things.

The fact is that we ended up in Basra only because of a decision made in the Turkish Parliament. Originally, we were to go in via Turkey, and our troops were to have been in Mosul and the Kurdish areas, which would have been a completely different proposition. We involved ourselves in an American-led invasion through a decision taken by our Prime Minister at a ranch in Texas, without reference to the people who would carry it out. We ended up taking responsibility for southern Iraq almost by accident.

Once we were in, we tried desperately to find the justification for being there—that is, weapons of mass destruction. We could not do so, and we have spent all our time since trying to get out of the country. We reduced our forces as soon as possible from 46,000-odd men and women to about 15,000. At the same time, we were telling anyone who wanted to hear how great we were at counter-insurgency. Our focus was not on development or the restoration of security for Basra—security which, by the way, we were obliged to restore under the Geneva convention—but on the reduction of forces.

We were also pretty complacent. I remember a friend of mine returning from a trip to Basra. He said that he had wandered around among the civilian population and realised what a big problem unemployment and the lack of fast resumption of some services would be. He said that he was amazed at the complacency that he found within the Ministry of Defence on the issue.

After the start of the Shi’a insurgency and increasing militia control of Basra and Amarah, we built a new police force. I suppose that it could be argued that it made sense to go to the existing groups of armed men, but unfortunately they were the militias, so almost from the off, we took away the pre-existing structures and put in post people whose first loyalty was not to Iraq, but to their own factions. The police were really just militias in uniform. The best example of that was Basra’s so-called Serious Crimes Unit, which was packed with people from the Jaish al-Mahdi—the JAM militia—who conducted their terrorist operations in police uniforms with police vehicles and weapons. They kidnapped the British CBS journalist Richard Butler last year, and they took two of our special forces people, who had to be rescued from a police station in Christmas 2006. As a senior Iraqi general was later to say, the police were, at the time, the cause of our security problem.

At that point, the increasingly terrorised civilian population lost confidence in the British, but we were busy being complacent about Iran. We made no serious attempt to control the border, possibly because we did not have sufficient troops. There was easy movement of men and equipment across the border, which fed the Shi’a insurgency right across the country. Nearly all that stuff came through the UK area.

From the start, we spent a lot of money on development, but as in the case of Afghanistan, we decided that it was important that the Iraqis were seen to be delivering services to the people, so we pumped the money through the provincial council in Basra. Guess what? A lot of people got rich, but services did not improve dramatically. Even today, Basrawis ask, “What did the British do for us?” There is little recognition of the UK’s effort, although I am told that much of what we see in Basra has been done by the British. We have not got the credit for our effort.

Because we had no clear strategy at that period apart from the reduction of troop numbers, we lost out to JAM. By 2006 it was JAM’s laws that counted, not what the British or the Iraqi Government had to say. For example, a hospital director in Basra tells the story of a male and a female doctor who were chatting. They continued chatting as they went out into the street, just by the gate. Someone from JAM ran out and fined the man for talking to a woman to whom he was not married and who was not a relative. The following week the same thing happened, but the fine doubled. The hospital director still asks how we could have allowed JAM’s law to take over.

We were unable to keep control over Amarah. By August we had retreated, but that was okay because we were handing over to the Iraqi army. The base that we had left was looted by the militias. As one very senior British officer put it, there was only one serious attempt to produce a counter-insurgency plan. That was General Richard Sheriff’s Operation Sinbad in late 2006. Sinbad was a brave attempt to take control of the city, but when in December 2006 the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Des Browne), returned to England after having been out there and being briefed on it, he is reported to have been extremely angry that the ground truth had not been getting through about the seriousness of the situation in southern Iraq and specifically in Basra.

The truth of Sinbad was that General Sheriff did not have the resources that he needed or Iraqi political top cover, and the Iraqi 10th Division stationed in Basra was not ready to do the job. Sinbad failed to deal with JAM, and from that point we started to spin the situation differently—it was no longer a question of insurgency. The Government made it clear that there would be no long-term resources of the kind needed for a proper counter-insurgency operation, so the line was that it was a matter of criminality, that the militias were just common criminals, that there was no political motivation to the militias’ actions and that we were dealing with Palermo, not Beirut. We said that it was a police problem, not an army problem, and certainly not a problem for a foreign Army like ours.

At about the same time, the US was putting lives and money on the line. After Sinbad, we made some serious attempts to capture and kill the JAM leadership in the first half of 2007. The problem, yet again, was that that was not part of a plan. We could take things, but we could not hold anything or build anything. By this point, 90 per cent. of the violence was directed at us. Why? Because we were the only people who were challenging the militia for control of the city. The casualty rate had reached such a level that when there was an opportunity to make an accommodation with JAM, we took it because we had to.

The deal was that JAM would stop killing British soldiers, if we released a load of prisoners and withdrew our forces into the airport. Suddenly, behold, peace reigned, but not for the people of Basra. JAM was in undisputed control, and its law was in force—extortion, smuggling, murder and rape. The funds from JAM’s control of Basra went to pay for the insurgency in Sadr City and elsewhere in the Shi’a uprising across Iraq.

In fairness, that was probably a sensible decision at the time, because we were losing a lot of troops and reconciliation seemed an obvious thing to do. But in retrospect, what have we done? Far from handing over Basra to the Iraqi authorities, as the Secretary of State said earlier, we handed it over to a murderous militia. There is a view, with which I have some sympathy, that if the people of Basra had not gone through that ghastly experience, they would not have welcomed the Iraqi Government as they did after Operation Charge of the Knights. That is a view.

Harry Cohen: I hear the hon. Gentleman’s point, and I will give my version of it if I catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I want to put something to the hon. Gentleman. “Newsnight” did a poll—at the end of 2007, I think—that showed that more than 80 per cent. of people in Basra did not want the British there. Does that not form part of the hon. Gentleman’s view?

Mr. Holloway: It is tragic. I was in Iraq in the first war as a soldier and in the second war as a television correspondent. I shall never forget being in Kirkuk as the Iraqi Government were falling. Very few European people were around, and I was literally mobbed. This guy who was in the process of looting two incubators from the hospital came up and hugged me because people were so happy and they wanted to thank anybody European. Later, however, there were the sorts of polls that the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Harry Cohen) has mentioned; I thank him for his intervention.

Not only the Iraqi people were fed up with us by that point. By March-April 2008, the Iraqi Government in Baghdad were fed up with the situation in Basra and believed it to be the fault of the British. As they saw it, we were sitting down at Basra airport in testudo—a tortoise formation—as if we were Roman soldiers with our shields around us. In fairness, I should say that the provincial reconstruction team was still doing its job and that we were still training the Iraqi army. However, our accommodation with the militia and, again, our lack of any clear purpose, prevented us from operating in the city.

It was clear to the Iraqi Government and the insurgents that, at that point, the main British strategy was that there should be no further loss of British life. The Iraqi Government became so impatient with us that on Monday 24 March, Prime Minister al-Maliki personally came to Basra to sort out the problem. My understanding is that no reference was made to the British before he came, although I think that he mentioned it to the Americans—who were not keen, by the way, because at the time they were trying to sort out al-Qaeda in Mosul. Essentially, the initiative was an Iraqi one.

On Tuesday 25 March, Operation Charge of the Knights was launched. Contrary to what the Secretary of State said, UK troops remained at the airport. By Friday, the US deputy core commander had come down to Basra and essentially taken control from the British—speak to the guys who were there. He brought with him Predators, Apaches, more Iraqi troops and firepower. Belatedly, UK military transition teams did give support—it was the 10th Division, I think. I am told that it was marvellous to see how our troops really got their act together and supported when they were given a part. However, it is simply disingenuous to suggest that Operation Charge of the Knights was, after the initial hiccup that has been mentioned, a joint thing.

By June, Amarah had been won back, but not by us; Prime Minister al-Maliki saw us as pretty irrelevant. He blamed us for the accommodation with JAM—although he might have been being disingenuous, because another British general swears blind that al-Maliki’s office was consulted about the accommodation before it happened. However, the bottom line was that al-Maliki felt that he was there to clear up the British mess, and that has shaped the UK-Iraqi relationship ever since. Although in Basra there is great respect for British troops, in Baghdad things were not the same because of the lack of any policy or strategy from the top. All along, all the British Government wanted was to get our troops out of Iraq.

Now—guess what?—the Iraqi Government are very enthusiastic to help us with that agenda. The status of forces agreement that will get us out of Iraq will leave us with fewer than 400 military personnel there. The Prime Minister will get the laurels for getting us out of Iraq, and Prime Minister al-Maliki can claim that he kicked the British out and that there is no further need for British forces in Basra. So from 30 June, apart from the people at our large embassy and in the provincial reconstruction teams, we will have only these servicemen and women: those at the naval training team at Umm Qasr, those training officer cadets at “Sandhurst in the sand”—al-Rustamiyah—and logistics and other advisers in the Iraqi MOD. That is down from nearly 5,000 personnel. We will also lose the deputy commanding generals in the multinational force and the multinational corps.

Since 2002, no one has really articulated our strategic relationship with Iraq. What is it? Despite all the good words over the years, it has always seemed as though the stories that we were told about what was happening on the ground were geared towards only one thing—getting us out of Iraq and away from the decision made by Tony Blair in Crawford. Right now, it seems that our strategy is to get out of Iraq before a UK general election, thereby removing a rather awkward election issue. While I agree that it is high time that we left, the manner of our departure and our conduct over the past five years sacrifice a strategic relationship with the second-biggest oil producer in the world and a people who, despite everything that has happened, still hold us in high regard and great affection.

The minuscule footprint that we are leaving behind does not include our highly successful mentoring role with the Iraqi armed forces. We are blowing an opportunity for an Oman-like loan service arrangement. In fairness, the Secretary of State said that the Basra Development Commission, under Sir Michael Wareing, is going well, but will British contracts be so welcomed, relevant or assured without British troops there? As my right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) said, others will seem to reap the benefits. Then, of course, our many friends in the Gulf remain nervous of Iraq and its history. We now have a great opportunity to try to break down that mistrust and set up Iraq as a bulwark against Iran’s continued export of terror.

The Government’s narrative is that the job is done in southern Iraq, but they choose to ignore some of the worrying reports of evolving terror networks, of which the Minister will be aware. Our troops and commanders on the ground have indeed done an extraordinary job. The trouble, throughout, has been a lack of strategy from London. Since our strategy was only ever to get out, we are left with nothing apart from a rather damaged reputation. We have no serious strategy for Iraq, we have no serious strategy for Afghanistan either, and we have no serious strategy for winning the war on terror that I, like everyone else in this House, am quite keen to win.

The truth is that Iraq remains a disaster for the United Kingdom, whatever the long-term benefits to the Iraqi people. As well as all the lives lost, the decision made at that ranch in Texas has acted only as a massive driver of radicalisation across the Muslim world. We are not leaving Iraq or Basra with the job done; we are leaving Iraq with the job made very much harder.